GR 91133; (March, 1993) (Digest)
G.R. No. 91133. March 22, 1993.
ROMINA M. SUAREZ, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH LXI, ANGELES CITY, respondents.
FACTS
Petitioner Romina M. Suarez was charged with multiple violations of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 (the Bouncing Check Law) in the Regional Trial Court of Angeles City. The cases were consolidated for trial. Petitioner pleaded not guilty, posted bail, and was granted provisional liberty. During the trial, petitioner did not appear in court despite notices. Her counsel de parte, Atty. Vicente San Luis, represented her during the prosecution’s presentation of evidence. When it was the defense’s turn to present evidence, the hearing was postponed. On the next scheduled date, Atty. Buen Zamar entered a special appearance for Atty. San Luis without petitioner’s consent. Atty. San Luis subsequently left for the United States without informing petitioner or formally withdrawing his appearance. Atty. Zamar requested postponements. The trial court later forfeited petitioner’s bail bonds due to her failure to appear. Notices for the promulgation of judgment were sent to petitioner’s address of record and received by her mother, who did not forward them, informing the process server that petitioner was out of the country. Judgments of conviction were promulgated in absentia, with a counsel de oficio appointed in one instance and Atty. Zamar present in another. Petitioner was later arrested. Represented by new counsel, she filed motions to set aside the judgment and to re-open the trial, which were denied. The Court of Appeals dismissed her subsequent petition.
ISSUE
Whether petitioner was denied due process of law, specifically her right to be heard and to present her defense, due to the negligence of her counsel.
RULING
Yes. The Supreme Court set aside the decisions of the Court of Appeals and the trial court, and directed the trial court to reopen the criminal cases for the reception of the defense evidence. The Court ruled that petitioner was deprived of due process. The negligence of her counsel de parte, Atty. Vicente San Luis, in abandoning the case without notice or formal withdrawal, directly led to her inability to present her defense. While a client is generally bound by the negligence of counsel, exceptions exist when such negligence is so great that it prejudices the client and prevents a fair presentation of the defense. Here, Atty. San Luis failed in his duties of fidelity, diligence, and attendance. The appearance of Atty. Zamar did not establish an attorney-client relationship, and notices sent to petitioner’s address were not effective notice in law as they were not received by her. Consequently, petitioner was denied her day in court.
