G.R. No. 89870; May 28, 1991
DAVID S. TILLSON, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. JUDGE LOURDES K. TAYAO-JAGUROS, JOHN M. COONEY, DEPUTY SHERIFF ROLANDO A. BALINGIT, and LT. COL. JUAN REYNALDO, respondents.

FACTS

Petitioner David S. Tillson sued Leonard La Pierre and Seacraft International Corporation for specific performance and damages concerning the construction of a yacht. La Pierre was declared in default, and a final judgment was rendered ordering him to pay Tillson monetary awards. To satisfy this judgment, the sheriff levied on two yachts, “Creala 36” and “Creala 40.” Seacraft filed a third-party claim over both vessels. Tillson posted an indemnity bond for the “Creala 40,” and it was subsequently sold at a public auction where Tillson was the highest bidder.
Respondent John M. Cooney later filed a separate replevin suit against Tillson before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, claiming ownership of the “Creala 40” by virtue of a deed of sale from Seacraft. Cooney posted a replevin bond, and the trial court issued a writ of seizure, leading to the vessel’s taking from Tillson’s possession. Tillson challenged this writ via certiorari in the Court of Appeals, which upheld the trial court’s order. Tillson elevated the case to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE

Whether the trial court properly issued the writ of seizure (replevin) in favor of Cooney, a party claiming under a third party (Seacraft) who had previously filed a third-party claim in the execution proceedings of Tillson’s case.

RULING

The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and annulled the writ of seizure. The Court held that Cooney, as a successor-in-interest of Seacraft, stepped into the shoes of the original third-party claimant. A third-party claim under Section 17, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court is a summary remedy available only to a person not a party to the action, against whom execution is issued. Since Seacraft was a party defendant in Tillson’s main case (Civil Case No. 54587), it was not a “third party” entitled to use this summary procedure. Its proper recourse was to seek relief directly from the court in that same case, not through a separate third-party claim.
Consequently, Cooney, deriving his claim from Seacraft, acquired no better right than his predecessor. He could not avail himself of the summary remedy of replevin under Rule 60 to recover property involved in pending litigation to which his predecessor was a party. The proper procedure for Cooney was to intervene in the original case or file a separate ordinary action to vindicate his claim, not a summary replevin suit. The trial court thus acted with grave abuse of discretion in issuing the writ of seizure. Possession of the “Creala 40” was ordered restored to Tillson.