GR 89762; (August, 1991) (Digest)
G.R. No. 89762; August 7, 1991
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ANTONIO LAZARTE y MOGALLON, accused-appellant.
FACTS
On October 8, 1986, Lorenzo Lara was awakened in his home by a knock. Upon opening the door, he found no one, but Nonito Jambunganan, the homeowner and Lara’s friend, entered through a window. Lara, upon embracing him, felt blood and wounds. When asked what happened, Nonito stated he was stabbed outside and, in response to Lara’s question, identified his assailants as “Tony, Suay Ric and Junior” before collapsing. He was declared dead on arrival. The subsequent police investigation was described as sloppy. Based solely on Lara’s deductions that these nicknames corresponded to Antonio Lazarte (“Tony”), Ricardo Ignacio (“Ric”), and two others at large, an information for murder was filed.
The defense presented denial and alibi. Lazarte testified he was at home all evening caring for his sick child, corroborated by a faith healer who treated the child until past midnight. Two defense witnesses, Fortunata Abe and Reynaldo de Paz, testified they saw the stabbing incident near a store and identified the assailants as a certain “Miguel” and “Mio Veloso,” not the appellant. Ricardo Ignacio, a co-accused, was later acquitted on demurrer to evidence.
ISSUE
Whether the prosecution proved the guilt of accused-appellant Antonio Lazarte beyond reasonable doubt.
RULING
No. The Supreme Court reversed the conviction and acquitted Antonio Lazarte. The Court found the prosecution’s evidence grossly insufficient to establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The sole basis for implicating Lazarte was the alleged dying declaration of the victim, as testified to by Lorenzo Lara. However, the Court ruled this declaration inadmissible. For a dying declaration to be admissible, the declarant must have a conscious belief in his impending death. The circumstances—the victim entering the house, embracing Lara, and answering questions—did not convincingly show he had abandoned all hope of survival. The declaration was thus unreliable.
Furthermore, the prosecution failed to present any corroborating evidence. There were no eyewitnesses from the prosecution, no murder weapon was recovered, and no motive was established. The identification of the appellant rested entirely on Lara’s interpretation of nicknames, which was speculative. The defense alibi, corroborated by a witness, and the positive testimony of two witnesses identifying other perpetrators created reasonable doubt. In criminal cases, the State must rely on the strength of its own evidence, not on the weakness of the defense. The prosecution’s evidence did not meet the test of moral certainty required for conviction.