G.R. No. 89318. April 3, 1990. ATTY. MARIANO R. SANTIAGO, petitioner, vs. HON. K. CASIANO P. ANUNCIACION, JR., HON. LUIS TUAZON, JR., and ATTY. ELEAZAR FERRY, respondents.
FACTS

The petitioner, Atty. Mariano R. Santiago, counsel for an accused in a kidnapping case, moved for reinvestigation after the alleged victim executed a sworn statement that she went voluntarily with the accused. On the date set for the submission of this statement, the victim’s mother had filed a separate charge for “disobedience” against her daughter before the Metropolitan Trial Court. When the alleged victim arrived at the courthouse, she was intercepted by law enforcement agents to serve a warrant of arrest from this disobedience case. The petitioner allegedly requested the officers to defer service until after she testified in the kidnapping case. This incident led to the filing of an indirect contempt charge against the petitioner before respondent Judge Anunciacion for allegedly obstructing the implementation of the arrest warrant.
During the hearing for indirect contempt, private respondent Atty. Eleazar Ferry entered his appearance as private prosecutor, with the conformity of the public prosecutor. The petitioner objected to this appearance, arguing it was unwarranted in the absence of a claim for damages. The respondent judge overruled the objection and denied the petitioner’s motion for time to elevate the matter. This prompted the petitioner to file the instant petition, resulting in the Supreme Court issuing a temporary restraining order against further proceedings.

ISSUE

Whether the appearance of a private prosecutor in the indirect contempt proceedings against the petitioner is proper and warranted.

RULING

The Supreme Court ruled that the appearance of the private prosecutor was improper. The legal logic is anchored on the nature of contempt proceedings and the rules governing the intervention of an offended party. A charge for indirect contempt partakes of the nature of a penal or criminal proceeding. As such, it is governed by the rules of criminal procedure, specifically Rule 110, Section 16 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure. This rule allows the offended party to intervene by counsel in the prosecution of the offense, subject to the direction and control of the fiscal, but primarily for the purpose of enforcing the civil liability of the accused.
The Court clarified that where the law defining the offense does not provide for an indemnity, the offended party may not intervene. In this case, the indirect contempt charge was initiated based on the petitioner’s alleged obstruction of the warrant’s service—an act considered an offense against the authority and dignity of the court, not a wrong against a private individual that gives rise to civil liability. The contempt proceeding, being criminal in character and vindicating public interest, involves no private party entitled to indemnity. Therefore, the intervention of Atty. Ferry on behalf of the complainant mother was unwarranted. The petition was granted, and the respondent judge was ordered to proceed with the contempt proceedings to be prosecuted solely by the fiscal. The Temporary Restraining Order was lifted.