GR 88632; (March, 1993) (Digest)
G.R. No. 88632 March 22, 1993
TEODULO GARCIA, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and SANTOS GUTIERREZ, respondents.
FACTS
Petitioner Teodulo Garcia bought a parcel of land in Manila, which was registered in his name on September 25, 1979. Before the purchase, the lot was leased by the former owner, Elvira Diguangco, to private respondent Santos Gutierrez under a February 1964 contract. The lease contract stated that the lessee would vacate and remove his house from the land after being notified by the lessor of the need for the land, and that the contract had no fixed period and depended solely on the lessor’s need for the land. Gutierrez built a house on the lot and occupied it since 1964. On November 19, 1978, before Garcia’s purchase, Gutierrez executed a written promise to vacate the land and remove improvements within ninety days. He failed to comply. After Garcia bought the lot, he demanded that Gutierrez vacate, but Gutierrez refused. Garcia filed a complaint with the Barangay Chairman, which was ignored, and then filed an ejectment case in the Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC) on December 7, 1982, citing his need to repossess the property for his own use. Gutierrez opposed, arguing non-compliance with the three-month advance notice requirement under Section 5(c) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 25. The MTC ruled in favor of Garcia. The Regional Trial Court (RTC) affirmed the MTC decision. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that Garcia, as the new owner not party to the original lease, should have himself given the three-month notice, and dismissed the complaint on jurisdictional grounds, stating the RTC was more competent to resolve questions on the sale’s effects.
ISSUE
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the ejectment complaint on the grounds that petitioner Garcia failed to give the three-month advance notice required under Section 5(c) of B.P. Blg. 25 and that the MTC lacked jurisdiction.
RULING
Yes, the Court of Appeals erred. The Supreme Court granted the petition, reversed the Court of Appeals decision, and reinstated the RTC decision.
The Supreme Court held that the lease contract, though without a fixed calendar period, had a definite term—it would terminate when the lessor needed the premises. Gutierrez’s written promise to vacate within ninety days from November 19, 1978, amended the original contract by stipulating a definite termination date (on or before February 19, 1979) and also constituted an admission that a three-month notice had been given by the original lessor. Upon the expiration of this period, the written lease contract expired under Section 5(f) of B.P. Blg. 25, providing a ground for ejectment independent of the requirements of Section 5(c). Furthermore, Garcia was subrogated to all rights of his predecessor-in-interest, including the right to eject based on the expired lease. The last paragraph of Section 5, which prohibits ejectment by a successor-in-interest on the ground of sale, applies only when the lease period has not yet expired; here, the lease had expired before the sale. The MTC had jurisdiction over the simple ejectment case, as the complaint’s allegations pertained solely to the right to eject based on expiration of the contract and repeated demands to vacate. B.P. Blg. 25 balances tenant protection with the rights of lessors who need the property for their own use, especially when they own no other available residential unit.
