G.R. No. 88183, 88467, 88672, 88781, 88916. October 3, 1990.
ISABELO J. ASTRAQUILLO, ALUNAN C. GLANG, and ALEJANDRO MELCHOR, JR., petitioners, vs. RAUL MANGLAPUS, as Secretary of Foreign Affairs, THE BOARD OF FOREIGN SERVICE ADMINISTRATION, and other respondents.

FACTS

The consolidated petitions involve the termination of the appointments of petitioners Isabelo Astraquillo, Alunan Glang, and Alejandro Melchor, Jr., all appointed by President Corazon Aquino as Ambassadors Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary. Astraquillo, appointed to the United Arab Emirates, was recalled following an investigation into allegations of misconduct. Glang, appointed to Kuwait, received a notice of termination of his services by authority of the President. Melchor, appointed to Moscow, was similarly recalled after an administrative complaint was filed against him by embassy personnel. In each instance, the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, acting by authority of the President, issued the orders for recall and termination. The petitioners uniformly contended that their removal was invalid, arguing that as Chiefs of Mission, they enjoyed security of tenure under the Foreign Service Act and could only be removed for cause after a formal investigation and hearing.

ISSUE

The central legal issue is whether the President has the power to terminate, at her pleasure and without the necessity of a formal hearing, the appointments of non-career ambassadors she appointed.

RULING

The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the respondents, upholding the President’s authority. The legal logic rests on the constitutional power of appointment vested in the President under Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, which expressly includes the power to appoint ambassadors. The Court distinguished between two classes within the foreign service: the career service, which enjoys security of tenure, and the non-career service, to which political appointees like the petitioners belong. Their appointments as ambassadors were characterized as primarily confidential and political in nature. The Court held that the power to appoint inherently includes the power to remove, a principle that applies to officials whose appointments are considered at the pleasure of the appointing authority. Since the petitioners were non-career ambassadors serving at the President’s discretion, their tenure was co-terminous with her confidence. The Foreign Service Act’s provisions on removal for cause were interpreted to apply specifically to career foreign service officers, not to presidential appointees occupying positions of trust and confidence. Therefore, the President’s act of terminating their services, communicated through the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, was a valid exercise of executive prerogative and did not require a prior administrative hearing. The petitions were dismissed.