G.R. No. 87721 -30 and G.R. No. 88004, December 21, 1989.
BENJAMIN P. ABELLA and SILVESTRE T. DE LA CRUZ, petitioners, vs. ADELINA INDAY LARRAZABAL, PROVINCIAL BOARD OF CANVASSERS OF LEYTE and COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondents.

FACTS

These consolidated petitions arose from the 1988 local elections for Governor of Leyte. Petitioner Benjamin Abella was the Liberal Party candidate. Private respondent Adelina Larrazabal filed her certificate of candidacy on January 31, 1988, substituting for her husband who had been disqualified. On election day, petitioner Silvestre de la Cruz filed a petition to disqualify Larrazabal for alleged false statements regarding her residence. The Supreme Court initially issued a temporary restraining order against her proclamation. Meanwhile, Abella raised objections during the provincial canvass and appealed the board’s rulings to the COMELEC in pre-proclamation cases. The COMELEC Second Division, on February 3, 1989, dismissed both the pre-proclamation appeals and the disqualification case. The en banc subsequently denied motions for reconsideration. The pre-proclamation dismissal is challenged in G.R. Nos. 87721-30, and the disqualification dismissal in G.R. No. 88004.

ISSUE

The primary issues are whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in: (1) dismissing the pre-proclamation appeals based on the provincial board’s failure to issue written rulings on objections; and (2) dismissing the disqualification case and referring it to the COMELEC Law Department for preliminary investigation instead of resolving it directly.

RULING

The Court ruled differently on the two petitions. In G.R. Nos. 87721-30 (pre-proclamation), the COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion. While Section 245 of the Omnibus Election Code mandates the board of canvassers to reduce its rulings to writing, the failure to do so should not prejudice the objecting party’s right to appeal. The Court found no such prejudice here, as the COMELEC had, in fact, reviewed the merits of Abella’s objections. The objections pertained to the form of the returns, not their authenticity, and thus were properly within the board’s jurisdiction to rule upon summarily. The COMELEC correctly affirmed the board’s rulings that the objections were merely formal and did not affect the validity of the returns.
In G.R. No. 88004 (disqualification), the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion. The disqualification petition, filed under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code, alleged that Larrazabal made a false material representation regarding her residency. The COMELEC Second Division dismissed it and referred the matter to its Law Department for a preliminary investigation on possible election offenses. The Court held this was error. A Section 78 proceeding is summary in nature, aimed at determining the candidate’s eligibility before election or proclamation. It is separate from a criminal prosecution for an election offense. By dismissing the petition and referring it for preliminary investigation, the COMELEC abdicated its duty to resolve the eligibility issue directly and summarily. The case was remanded to the COMELEC for immediate hearing and resolution on the disqualification issue. The Court also referred its temporary restraining order to the COMELEC, authorizing it to maintain or lift the order based on its assessment of the evidence.