G.R. No. 87110 ; January 24, 1996
Gil Rubio, petitioner, vs. The Hon. Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 4, Cagayan de Oro City, City Sheriff of Cagayan de Oro City, and Spouses Lim Liong Kang and Lim Pue King, respondents.

FACTS

Private respondents, the registered owners of a parcel of land, filed an action for ejectment and damages against petitioner Gil Rubio, who had constructed buildings on the property. The Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) ruled in favor of the respondents, ordering Rubio to vacate the premises and pay rental arrears. This decision was successively affirmed by the Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals, the latter modifying only the amount of arrears. The CA decision became final and executory on September 14, 1988. Upon remand, respondents moved for the issuance of a writ of demolition. The MTCC granted the motion, ordering Rubio to remove his structures within thirty days or face demolition.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration, arguing that the demolition order was procedurally improper without a prior writ of execution and that a supervening event—a decision by another RTC branch in a separate case for specific performance (Civil Case No. 8983) declaring a third party as the true owner and the respondents as buyers in bad faith—had altered the parties’ rights and justified suspending execution. The MTCC denied his motion, emphasizing that the ejectment case concerned possession, not ownership, and that Rubio was not a party to the other case. A writ of demolition was subsequently issued and implemented.

ISSUE

Whether the pendency and final judgment in a separate action resolving ownership constitutes a supervening event that justifies the suspension of execution of a final and executory judgment in an ejectment case.

RULING

No. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, ruling that a final and executory judgment in an ejectment action must be executed as a matter of right. The Court clarified that a writ of demolition is a component of a writ of execution when necessary to enforce a judgment for the delivery or restitution of possession, especially when structures by the defeated party prevent such restitution. The legal logic is rooted in the nature of ejectment proceedings, which are designed to provide a speedy remedy for the recovery of physical possession (possession de facto) and are summary in nature. The only issue therein is material possession, and the question of ownership is merely provisional and does not preclude execution.
The alleged supervening event—the RTC decision in the separate ownership case—does not affect the finality of the ejectment judgment. The ejectment case and the action for specific performance involve different causes of action and parties. The law explicitly provides that a motion for reconsideration of an order of execution does not suspend its period for enforcement. Furthermore, the pendency or even a favorable judgment in an action for reconveyance of title does not divest a city or municipal court of its jurisdiction over the ejectment case or bar the execution of its judgment. The policy is to prevent delay in restoring possession, as ownership disputes can be litigated in the appropriate forum without impeding the possessory decree. Thus, the MTCC committed no grave abuse of discretion in issuing the orders and the writ of demolition.