GR 86603; (February, 1990) (Digest)
G.R. No. 86603 February 5, 1990
ACTIVE WOOD PRODUCTS CO., INC., petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, STATE INVESTMENT HOUSE, INC., and ATTY. VICTORINO P. EVANGELISTA, Ex-Officio, Sheriff of Malolos, Bulacan, respondents.
FACTS
Petitioner Active Wood Products Co., Inc. mortgaged two parcels of land to respondent State Investment House, Inc. (SIHI). Upon foreclosure, the properties were auctioned to SIHI. Active Wood subsequently filed Civil Case No. 6518-M in Branch XX of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos, Bulacan, challenging the validity of the foreclosure. Meanwhile, SIHI filed a separate “Petition for Writ of Possession,” docketed as LRC Case No. P-39-84, which was raffled to Branch XIV of the same RTC. Active Wood moved for the consolidation of the LRC case with its earlier-filed civil case in Branch XX, arguing they involved common issues regarding the same land and mortgage.
The presiding judge of Branch XIV initially ordered the consolidation of the LRC case with the civil case in Branch XX, contingent on the latter judge’s concurrence. However, the judge of Branch XX issued an order returning the LRC case to Branch XIV, effectively objecting to the consolidation. Active Wood’s motion for reconsideration was denied. The Court of Appeals upheld the denial, ruling that consolidation under the Rules of Court is proper only when cases are pending before the same judge or branch.
ISSUE
Whether the Regional Trial Court can order the consolidation of two related cases pending in two different branches of the same court.
RULING
Yes, the Supreme Court ruled in favor of consolidation. The Court held that Section 1, Rule 31 of the Rules of Court, which allows consolidation when actions involve a common question of law or fact, does not distinguish between cases pending before the same branch and those pending in different branches of the same court. The paramount rationale for consolidation is to avoid the possibility of conflicting decisions and to serve the orderly administration of justice by having intimately related cases adjudicated by a single branch.
The Court rejected SIHI’s argument that an ordinary civil action (Civil Case No. 6518-M) could not be consolidated with a special proceeding (LRC Case No. P-39-84). While a petition for a writ of possession is typically an ex-parte proceeding, its foundation—the right of ownership derived from the foreclosure—is directly contested in the civil case. When the presumed right is challenged, the technical distinction between an action and a proceeding becomes insignificant. Consolidation becomes logical and desirable to thoroughly litigate all related issues, avoid confusion, and prevent unnecessary costs and multiplicity of suits.
The Supreme Court emphasized that procedural rules should be liberally construed to secure a just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of cases. It found the Court of Appeals to have committed a reversible error. Consolidating the later-filed LRC case with the earlier-filed civil case in Branch XX would promote expeditious and less expensive determination. The Supreme Court itself follows a practice of consolidating related cases pending in different divisions with the ponente of the case with the lower docket number. The petition was granted, and the cases were ordered consolidated in Branch XX.
