GR 86564; (August, 1989) (Digest)
G.R. No. 86564 August 1, 1989
RAMON L. LABO, JR., petitioner, vs. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (COMELEC) EN BANC AND LUIS L. LARDIZABAL, respondents.
FACTS
Petitioner Ramon L. Labo, Jr., proclaimed Mayor-elect of Baguio City on January 20, 1988, sought to restrain the COMELEC from inquiring into his citizenship. Private respondent Luis L. Lardizabal filed a petition for quo warranto on January 26, 1988, but the COMELEC initially docketed it as a pre-proclamation controversy (SPC Case No. 88-288), for which no filing fee was required. The COMELEC later re-docketed it as a quo warranto case (EPC Case No. 88-19) on February 8, 1988, and Lardizabal paid the P300 filing fee on February 10, 1988. Labo argued the petition was filed beyond the ten-day reglementary period under Section 253 of the Omnibus Election Code, as the fee payment—deemed indispensable—occurred twenty-one days post-proclamation.
ISSUE
Whether the COMELEC acquired jurisdiction over the quo warranto petition despite the alleged late payment of the filing fee.
RULING
The Supreme Court ruled the petition was filed on time, upholding COMELEC’s jurisdiction. The legal logic centered on the suspension of the reglementary period and the inapplicability of the filing fee requirement at the time of initial filing. First, when COMELEC treated the petition as a pre-proclamation controversy, the period for filing an election protest or quo warranto was deemed suspended under Section 248 of the Omnibus Election Code. Thus, the ten-day period was tolled, and the subsequent payment on February 10, 1988, fell within the allowable time. Second, the Court found the filing fee requirement was not effective when Lardizabal filed his petition. COMELEC Resolution No. 1996, which mandated the fee, took effect only on March 3, 1988, after publication, as required by Republic Act No. 6646 and the due process clause established in Tañada v. Tuvera. An earlier resolution, No. 1450, lacked proof of publication. Consequently, no valid rule required fee payment at the initial filing date. The Court distinguished the case from Manchester v. Court of Appeals, noting special circumstances where delay was not attributable to the petitioner’s fault. Since the fee was ultimately paid and the delay resulted from COMELEC’s procedural reclassification, the petition was timely, conferring jurisdiction on COMELEC to proceed with the citizenship inquiry.