GR 84939; (March, 1991) (Digest)
G.R. No. 84939; March 13, 1991
NICARIO AVISADO & TORIBIO ALFECHE, petitioners, vs. SPS. JORGE & NARCISA VILLAFUERTE and COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
FACTS
Spouses Jorge and Narcisa Villafuerte filed an action for damages and declaration of nullity of contract against Nicario Avisado and Toribio Alfeche in the Regional Trial Court of Cebu. The petitioners failed to file an answer, leading the trial court to declare them in default and proceed with an ex parte hearing. Petitioners moved to set aside the default order, arguing improper substituted service of summons, but the motion was denied. The trial court subsequently rendered a judgment declaring the subject contracts null and void and ordering petitioners to pay various sums in damages.
Petitioners appealed to the then Intermediate Appellate Court. They were initially granted a 90-day extension to file their appellant’s brief. However, their counsel, Atty. Lucinio Sayman, passed away during this period. Upon being notified of the counsel’s death, the Court of Appeals granted a second 30-day extension, deeming it inextendible. The new counsel, facing difficulties in reconstituting the records, filed a motion for a final extension to May 5, 1988. The appellate court denied this motion and dismissed the appeal for failure to file the brief on time.
ISSUE
Whether the Court of Appeals gravely abused its discretion in dismissing the appeal for failure to file the appellant’s brief within the extended period.
RULING
Yes. The Supreme Court granted the petition and reinstated the appeal. The Court emphasized that while the grant of extensions for filing briefs is discretionary, such discretion must be exercised wisely and prudently to achieve substantial justice, balancing the policy of speedy litigation with a litigant’s right to be heard. The death of the original counsel constituted a “good and sufficient cause” warranting leniency.
The Court considered the attendant circumstances: the petitioners’ financial difficulty in immediately securing new counsel, the new counsel’s legitimate dilemma in gathering and reconstituting case records from a deceased predecessor, and the fact that the appellant’s brief was actually filed on May 4, 1988—a day before the deadline sought in the final motion. This demonstrated earnest effort and a lack of intent to delay. The dismissal, under these specific facts, was too severe a penalty, and the interest of justice demanded that the appeal be heard on its merits. The resolutions of the Court of Appeals dated April 25, 1988 and May 31, 1988 were set aside.