G.R. No. 84623 May 8, 1992
FELIPE TORIBIO and JULIAN LABRADOR, petitioners, vs. HON. TEMISTOCLES B. DIEZ, Judge, Regional Trial Court, Negros Oriental (Branch 37), and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

FACTS

Petitioners Felipe Toribio and Julian Labrador, along with Vicente Saycon, were convicted of arson through reckless imprudence by the Regional Trial Court of Negros Oriental, Branch 37, on February 12, 1986. Each was sentenced to pay a fine of P15,000.00, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. On February 19, 1986, they perfected an appeal to the Court of Appeals. On December 8, 1986, Toribio and Labrador (Saycon having died) filed a pleading entitled “Explanation and Withdrawal of Appeals” in the Court of Appeals, stating they were applying for probation and were no longer interested in prosecuting the appeal. The Court of Appeals issued a Resolution on May 13, 1987, dismissing the case as to Saycon and considering the appeal of Toribio and Labrador withdrawn on the ground they were going to apply for probation. On June 3, 1987, after the records were remanded to the RTC, Toribio and Labrador filed a “Motion for Probation.” The Assistant Provincial Fiscal opposed, citing Presidential Decree No. 1990, which amended the Probation Law (P.D. No. 968) to provide that “no application for probation shall be entertained or granted if the defendant has perfected an appeal from the judgment of conviction.” Petitioners argued that P.D. No. 1990, published in the Official Gazette on December 30, 1985 but released for circulation only on July 1, 1986, became effective on July 16, 1986, after they had perfected their appeal in February 1986. They contended that at the time of their appeal, the original Probation Law allowed them to apply for probation even after perfecting an appeal, and the amendatory law should not be applied retroactively. The Trial Judge denied their motion for probation by Order dated January 7, 1988, ruling that their application was filed almost a year after P.D. No. 1990 became effective and was filed beyond the period for perfecting an appeal.

ISSUE

Whether the petitioners’ application for probation should be granted, considering they perfected their appeal under the original Probation Law (P.D. No. 968) which allowed an application for probation even after an appeal, before the amendatory law (P.D. No. 1990) — which prohibits probation if an appeal has been perfected — took effect.

RULING

The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the petitioners. The Court nullified and set aside the challenged Order of the Trial Court and directed it to accept and pass upon the merits of the petitioners’ application for probation. The Court held that at the time the petitioners perfected their appeal in February 1986, the law (P.D. No. 968) did not prohibit them from subsequently applying for probation. The amendatory law (P.D. No. 1990), which removed the option to appeal and then apply for probation, took effect only on July 16, 1986, five months after the perfection of their appeal. It was unreasonable to expect petitioners in February 1986 to comply with a requirement that did not yet exist. Their right to apply for probation should be determined under the law in force at the time they perfected their appeal. The Trial Court erred in applying the amendatory law retroactively to deprive them of that right, amounting to grave abuse of discretion.