G.R. No. 84193 February 15, 1990
DIOSDADO V. RUFFY, petitioner, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and CENTRAL AZUCARERA DON PEDRO, respondents.

FACTS

Petitioner Diosdado Ruffy was employed by private respondent Central Azucarera Don Pedro. His duties included verifying and issuing materials. On November 3, 1984, he issued twenty-five sets of roller bearings valued at P15,650.00 to a person who signed as “Role.” The bearings were never received by the requisitioning section and were later discovered to have been sold to a third party by another employee, Anastacio Maulleon, Jr. During the company investigation, Ruffy stated he could not remember if the recipient was a co-employee named Alfredo Role, who denied receiving the items.
Consequently, on December 19, 1984, the company served Ruffy a notice of dismissal effective December 31, 1984, citing breach of trust, gross negligence, and flagrant inefficiency. An investigation was conducted only after this notice of termination was issued. The Labor Arbiter and the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) upheld the dismissal as legal, finding substantial compliance with procedural requirements under Batas Pambansa Blg. 130, though granting financial assistance. Ruffy filed this certiorari petition, alleging grave abuse of discretion.

ISSUE

Whether the respondent NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in affirming the legality of Ruffy’s dismissal despite an alleged violation of the procedural due process requirements under Section 13 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 130.

RULING

Yes. The Supreme Court granted the petition, finding the dismissal procedurally infirm. The legal logic centers on the mandatory sequence of due process in termination cases as prescribed by Section 13 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 130 and its implementing rules. The law requires the employer to furnish the worker a written notice stating the causes for termination and to afford him ample opportunity to be heard and defend himself before a decision to dismiss is made.
In this case, the sequence was reversed. Ruffy was given a notice of dismissal on December 19, 1984, effective at year-end, before he was afforded any hearing or opportunity to present his defense. The Court held that conducting an investigation after the notice of termination had been issued violated the spirit and intent of the law. The “ample opportunity” required by law means providing every kind of assistance to enable the employee to prepare an adequate defense prior to the decision to terminate. The interregnum between the notice and its effectivity date did not cure this defect, as the decision to dismiss had already been communicated. The procedure followed amounted to “fire the employee, and let him explain later,” which is a denial of due process.
Consequently, while there might have been a valid cause for dismissal, the failure to observe the proper procedural sequence rendered the termination illegal. The Court ordered Ruffy’s reinstatement with three years of backwages, without loss of seniority rights and benefits. The NLRC’s affirmation of the Labor Arbiter’s decision was thus tainted with grave abuse of discretion for disregarding this fundamental procedural requirement.