G.R. No. 84163 October 19, 1989
LITO VINO, petitioner, vs. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and THE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.

FACTS

Petitioner Lito Vino was charged with murder as a principal for the killing of Roberto Tejada. The prosecution evidence established that on the night of the incident, after hearing gunshots and the victim’s cries, the victim’s father and brother saw Vino driving a bicycle with Jessie Salazar, who was carrying an armalite. They stopped near the victim, and Salazar pointed the weapon at the witnesses before they left. The victim, in an ante-mortem statement, identified Salazar as his assailant. Vino was separately tried, and the trial court, while finding the crime of murder proven, convicted Vino not as a principal but as an accessory under Article 19, paragraph 3 of the Revised Penal Code for assisting Salazar’s escape. The Court of Appeals affirmed this conviction.
During the pendency of Vino’s appeal, Jessie Salazar, the alleged principal, was separately tried for the same murder. In a decision rendered after Vino’s conviction, Salazar was acquitted by the same Regional Trial Court due to the prosecution’s failure to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Vino filed a motion for reconsideration, arguing that his conviction as an accessory could not stand following the principal’s acquittal.

ISSUE

Whether the conviction of an accused as an accessory under Article 19, paragraph 3 of the Revised Penal Code can be sustained after the acquittal of the alleged principal in a separate proceeding.

RULING

No. The Supreme Court granted the motion for reconsideration and acquitted petitioner Lito Vino. The legal logic is anchored on the principle that the criminal liability of an accessory under paragraph 3 of Article 19 (one who assists in the escape of the principal) is derivative and inseparable from the liability of the principal. For such an accessory to be convicted, it must be proven not only that a crime was committed but also that the person assisted was indeed the principal guilty of that crime. In this case, while the crime of murder was proven, the identity of the murderer was not established with finality because the alleged principal, Jessie Salazar, was acquitted. The court emphasized a distinction: an accessory under paragraph 2 (e.g., one who conceals the effects of the crime) may be convicted even if the principal is not convicted or is acquitted on grounds of exemption, provided the commission of the crime itself is proven. However, for an accessory under paragraph 3, the acquittal of the principal, based on the failure to prove his guilt, necessarily absolves the accessory. Since Salazar was found not to be the killer, Vino’s act of driving him away could not legally constitute assisting in the escape of a principal in the crime of murder. Therefore, Vino’s conviction could not stand.