G.R. No. 84163 October 19, 1989
LITO VINO, petitioner, vs. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and THE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.

FACTS

Petitioner Lito Vino was charged with murder as a principal for the killing of Roberto Tejada. The prosecution evidence established that on the night of March 21, 1985, the victim was shot. Shortly after the shooting, the victim’s father and brother saw Vino driving a bicycle with Jessie Salazar, who was carrying an armalite. The duo stopped near the victim, with Salazar pointing the weapon at the victim’s family, before leaving the scene. The victim, in an ante-mortem statement, identified Salazar as his assailant. The case against Salazar, initially referred to military authorities, was later filed separately in civil court. Vino was tried alone. The trial court, while finding the evidence insufficient to convict him as a principal, found him guilty as an accessory under Article 19, paragraph 3 of the Revised Penal Code for assisting Salazar’s escape. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction.
During the pendency of Vino’s appeal, Jessie Salazar was tried separately for the same murder. In a decision dated August 29, 1988, the same Regional Trial Court acquitted Salazar, finding that the prosecution failed to prove his guilt as the principal beyond reasonable doubt. Vino filed a motion for reconsideration of the Supreme Court’s initial denial of his petition, arguing that his conviction as an accessory could not stand following the acquittal of the alleged principal.

ISSUE

Whether the conviction of an accused as an accessory under Article 19, paragraph 3 of the Revised Penal Code can be sustained after the acquittal of the alleged principal in a separate proceeding.

RULING

No. The Supreme Court granted the motion for reconsideration and acquitted petitioner Lito Vino. The legal logic is anchored on the principle that the criminal liability of an accessory under paragraph 3 of Article 19 (one who assists in the escape of the principal) is derivative and inseparable from the liability of the principal. For such an accessory to be held liable, it must first be proven that the person he assisted is indeed guilty of the crime. In this case, the very court that convicted Vino as an accessory later acquitted Jessie Salazar, the alleged principal, in a separate trial. The acquittal meant that Salazar was not proven to be the killer. Consequently, Vino’s act of driving Salazar away from the scene could not legally constitute the crime of assisting in the escape of a principal in the crime of murder, as there was no convicted principal to whom his liability could attach. The Court distinguished this from liability as an accessory under paragraph 2 of Article 19 (e.g., concealing the effects of the crime), which may stand independently even if the principal is not convicted, provided the commission of the crime itself is proven. Here, while the crime of murder was proven to have occurred, the identity of the principal was not. Therefore, Vino’s conviction as an accessory under paragraph 3 could not be sustained.