GR 83463; (May, 1991) (Digest)
G.R. No. 83463; May 27, 1991
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HON. GENARO GINES, PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH XXVI, SAN FERNANDO, LA UNION, RAMON LABO, JR., and FRANCIS FLORESCA, respondents.
FACTS
An information for libel was filed against Ramon Labo, Jr., Francis Floresca, and Perfecto Manaois. Labo and Floresca were arraigned and pleaded not guilty. Manaois was later excluded after being found not the publisher/editor. The prosecution sought to include Benefredo Esquivel as a new accused, and a preliminary investigation was pending for this purpose. The case underwent several postponements, some due to the private complainant’s eye surgeries and medical travel.
On October 15, 1987, the trial court dismissed the case against Labo and Floresca for the private complainant’s failure to appear and present evidence, despite the fiscal’s objection and request for deferment due to the ongoing preliminary investigation of Esquivel. The prosecution’s motion for reconsideration was denied.
ISSUE
Whether the trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the criminal case for libel against the accused.
RULING
Yes, the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion. The dismissal was improper because the case was not yet ready for trial. The prosecution had a valid reason for seeking a postponement: the preliminary investigation for including a new accused, Benefredo Esquivel, was still pending. The court had previously granted a motion for joint hearing of all accused. Therefore, it should have directed the fiscal to complete the investigation within a reasonable time and deferred the hearing until Esquivel could be arraigned, rather than dismissing the case outright for the complainant’s absence.
Furthermore, the reinstatement of the case does not place the accused in double jeopardy. For double jeopardy to attach, the dismissal must be without the express consent of the accused. Here, the accused moved for dismissal based on the right to a speedy trial. The general rule is that a dismissal upon the accused’s motion does not bar a revival, unless grounded on insufficiency of evidence or an unreasonably prolonged trial in violation of speedy trial rights. Neither exception applies here, as the delays were not unreasonable and were partly due to procedural steps to include a proper party. Thus, the orders of dismissal are set aside and the criminal case is reinstated for further proceedings.