GR 83346; (March, 1990) (Digest)
G.R. No. 83346 March 22, 1990
MEDRANO & ASSOCIATES, INC., petitioner, vs. ROXAS & CO., ET AL., respondents.
FACTS
Petitioner Medrano & Associates, Inc. filed an action for damages against respondent Roxas & Co. in the Regional Trial Court of Manila. On March 6, 1986, the trial court, motu proprio, ordered the dismissal of the case without prejudice for failure to prosecute. On May 5, 1986, petitioner filed a “motion to set” with a request for subpoena, seeking to schedule a hearing. Counsel for petitioner received a copy of the dismissal order only on May 7, 1986, two days after filing the motion. The trial court, acting on the motion, calendared the case for hearing in June 1986, though the corresponding order was not signed or sent. The court subsequently reset hearings for September and December 1986.
Respondent filed manifestations asserting that the March 1986 dismissal order had become final, arguing the “motion to set” did not toll the period for appeal or reconsideration. The trial court, now presided by a different judge, ultimately agreed with respondent. It cancelled the scheduled hearing and upheld the finality of the dismissal order in its December 3, 1986 order, which was later reaffirmed. Petitioner appealed, contending the “motion to set” should be treated as a motion for reconsideration.
ISSUE
Whether the trial court erred in declaring its order of dismissal final and in refusing to proceed with the trial on the merits.
RULING
Yes, the trial court erred. The Supreme Court reversed the appealed orders and remanded the case for further proceedings. The legal logic centers on substantial justice over technicality and the trial court’s own curative actions. While the “motion to set” filed on May 5, 1986, could not literally be a motion for reconsideration of an order received on May 7, the trial court’s subsequent conduct effectively treated it as such and reconsidered its dismissal.
By actively setting the case for hearing on three separate occasions after the dismissal, the trial court implicitly granted reconsideration and reopened the case. This series of judicial actions negated the finality of the dismissal order. The Court emphasized that pre-trial had been conducted and some evidence presented, making disposition on the merits preferable. Furthermore, the original dismissal was without prejudice, meaning petitioner could refile. To avoid circuity and delay, reopening the existing case served the interest of justice more efficiently than insisting on a technical finality that the court’s own conduct had vitiated. The primordial end of justice is better served by deciding cases on their merits.