G.R. No. 82606 December 18, 1992
Prima Partosa-Jo, petitioner, vs. The Honorable Court of Appeals and Ho Hang (with aliases Jose Jo and Consing), respondents.

FACTS

Petitioner Prima Partosa-Jo claims to be the legal wife of private respondent Jose Jo, who admits to cohabiting with three women and fathering fifteen children. In 1980, the petitioner filed two consolidated cases against Jo in the Regional Trial Court: one for support (Civil Case No. 36) and another for judicial separation of conjugal property (Civil Case No. 51). On November 29, 1983, the trial court rendered a decision declaring the marriage legal and ordering Jo to provide monthly support, arrears, and attorney’s fees to Prima. However, the dispositive portion of the decision made no ruling on the complaint for judicial separation of conjugal property, although the body of the decision contained a penultimate paragraph stating that the properties in question were subject to separation of property under Article 178 of the Civil Code. Jo appealed to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the support aspect but dismissed the complaint for judicial separation of conjugal property for lack of a cause of action, noting that the separation was by agreement and not due to abandonment, and that the trial court’s dispositive portion omitted a ruling on it. Both parties filed motions for reconsideration, which were denied. Jo’s petition to the Supreme Court was dismissed for tardiness, affirming the marriage and support obligation. The present petition deals solely with the complaint for judicial separation of conjugal property.

ISSUE

1. Whether the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the judicial separation of conjugal property sought was not allowed under Articles 175, 178, and 191 of the Civil Code.
2. Whether the Court of Appeals erred in holding that no such separation was decreed by the trial court in the dispositive portion of its decision.

RULING

The Supreme Court granted the petition and modified the decision of the Court of Appeals.
On the second issue, the Court held that while the dispositive portion of the trial court’s decision was incomplete for omitting a ruling on the complaint for judicial separation, the penultimate paragraph of the decision constituted a ruling based on findings in the body of the decision. The technical defect of an ambiguous or omitted dispositive portion can be clarified by amendment even after finality, resorting to the pleadings and findings in the text. The respondent court should have made the necessary modification instead of dismissing the case, upholding form over substance. In the interest of substantive justice, the Supreme Court made such modification.
On the merits, the Court held that the grounds for judicial separation of property were present. Under Article 128 of the Family Code, which supersedes Article 178(3) of the Civil Code, judicial separation may be granted on two grounds: abandonment without just cause, or failure to comply with obligations to the family without just cause. The record showed that as early as 1942, Jo had rejected Prima, denying her admission to their conjugal home, demonstrating an intention not to resume conjugal relations. From 1968 onward, he refused financial support. This physical separation and refusal to support constituted abandonment. Additionally, Jo failed to comply with his family obligations by cohabiting with other women, siring children with them, and refusing to provide for his lawful wife and daughter without just cause. The Supreme Court applied Article 128 of the Family Code, as an appellate court may dispose of a question according to the law prevailing at the time of disposition, not at the time of the original judgment.
The Supreme Court ordered the division of the conjugal property between petitioner and private respondent, share and share alike, to be implemented by the trial court after determining all properties pertaining to the conjugal partnership, including those illegally registered in the names of other persons.