GR 82350; (October, 1991) (Digest)
G.R. No. 82350 October 7, 1991
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ISAAC LONDOÑO, accused-appellant.
FACTS
Accused-appellant Isaac Londoño was charged with rape before the Regional Trial Court of Legaspi City. After the prosecution rested its case, Londoño, with prior leave of court, filed a demurrer to evidence under the then-existing Section 15, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court. The trial court, by order dated July 27, 1987, deemed the case submitted for decision, ruling that by filing the demurrer, Londoño had waived his right to present evidence. Londoño filed a motion arguing that this application of the rule was unconstitutional, but the court denied it. Subsequently, the court promulgated a judgment finding Londoño guilty of rape and sentencing him to reclusion perpetua.
Londoño appealed his conviction. During the pendency of his appeal, on November 13, 1988, an amendment to Section 15, Rule 119 took effect. The amended rule provided that if an accused files a demurrer to evidence with prior leave of court and the motion is denied, the accused retains the right to adduce evidence. Only a demurrer filed without leave of court results in a waiver of the right to present evidence.
ISSUE
Whether the amended Section 15, Rule 119, which is favorable to the accused, should be applied retroactively to Londoño’s case, which was pending on appeal at the time of its enactment.
RULING
Yes. The Supreme Court, applying the doctrine established in Oñas v. Sandiganbayan, ruled in favor of Londoño. The Court held that procedural laws, such as the Rules of Court, may be applied retroactively to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage, provided that no vested rights are impaired. The amended rule is a procedural statute that governs the manner of presenting evidence.
Since the amended provision is favorable to the accused, it should be given retroactive effect. Londoño had filed his demurrer with express prior leave of court. Under the new rule, the denial of his demurrer did not result in a waiver of his right to present evidence. Consequently, the trial court committed a grave error in convicting him based solely on the prosecution’s evidence after denying his demurrer, as it deprived him of his right to due process and to present his defense.
The Supreme Court set aside the trial court’s orders and the judgment of conviction. The case was remanded to the trial court for the reception of Londoño’s evidence and further proceedings.