G.R. No. 81861 and G.R. No. 83114, September 8, 1989
BERNABE QUE and AMELIA QUE, spouses, petitioners, vs. HON. RODRIGO V. COSICO, in his capacity as Presiding Judge, Branch 17, Regional Trial Court, Roxas City and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner-appellant, vs. PAZ L. MARTELINO AND THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS (FOURTH DIVISION), respondents-appellees.

FACTS

The accused, including spouses Bernabe and Amelia Que and Paz Martelino, were charged with estafa through falsification of commercial documents. During the hearing on November 10, 1986, defense counsel Atty. Rodriguez Dadivas orally moved for the inhibition of the presiding judge, Judge Enrique Suplico, citing pending administrative charges filed against him. The private prosecutor, Atty. Roberto Barrios, joined the motion and insisted that the judge rule on it before proceeding. Judge Suplico repeatedly ordered the prosecution to present its evidence, as its principal witness was present and ready to testify. However, the prosecution maintained its stance on the inhibition motion. Invoking the accused’s right to a speedy trial, defense counsel Atty. Lorenzo Coloso and Atty. Alberto Villarruz moved for dismissal. Judge Suplico then issued an order dismissing the case.
The prosecution filed a motion for reconsideration. Subsequently, the case was re-raffled to Judge Rodrigo Cosico following judicial reorganization. Judge Cosico granted the prosecution’s motion for reconsideration, reinstated the criminal case, and set it for trial. The accused moved for reconsideration, arguing that reinstatement would place them in double jeopardy, but Judge Cosico denied their motion.

ISSUE

Whether the reinstatement of the criminal case by Judge Cosico placed the accused in double jeopardy.

RULING

No, reinstatement did not place the accused in double jeopardy. For double jeopardy to attach, the following elements must concur: (1) a valid complaint or information; (2) a court of competent jurisdiction; (3) the accused had pleaded to the charge; and (4) the accused was acquitted, convicted, or the case was dismissed or terminated without his express consent. The pivotal element absent here is the dismissal of the case without the express consent of the accused. The record shows that the accused, through their counsel, actively invoked their right to a speedy trial and moved for the dismissal of the case. By doing so, they expressly consented to the dismissal. A dismissal upon the instance or with the consent of the accused constitutes a waiver of their right against double jeopardy, as it is deemed a discharge not amounting to an acquittal.
Furthermore, the dismissal by Judge Suplico was capricious and precipitate. The prosecution was not responsible for deliberate delay; its witness was present and ready to testify. The prosecution’s insistence on a ruling for the inhibition motion was not dilatory but a procedural point affecting the trial’s integrity. Judge Suplico could have promptly ruled on the motion instead of dismissing the case. His reaction indicated bias. Since the dismissal was with the accused’s consent and was improperly granted, the reinstatement by Judge Cosico was valid and did not violate the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy.