GR L 37933; (April, 1988) (Digest)
March 14, 2026GR L 40953; (April, 1988) (Digest)
March 14, 2026G.R. No. 81833 April 18, 1989
CATALINA B. VDA. DE ALVIR, ANTONIO MA. B. ALVIR, RENE MA. B. ALVIR, ROBERTO B. ALVIR AND DOUGLAS B. ALVIR, petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and HOWARD J. WEBER, respondents.
FACTS
In November 1961, petitioners Catalina Vda. de Alvir and her children (except Douglas, then a minor) executed a deed of sale in favor of private respondent Howard J. Weber, an American citizen, conveying their rights and interests over a 250-square meter lot in San Juan for P5,000. The contract stipulated payment terms: P1,500 upon signing, P1,500 upon settlement of a bank encumbrance, and a P2,000 balance payable from commissions Weber might earn from the vendors within two years, or, failing that, payable in cash 30 days after the two-year period. Weber paid P3,000 and constructed a house on the lot.
The property was part of the estate of the late Antonio D. Alvir. In 1968, the intestate court approved a project of partition. Through a raffle among the heirs, the subject portion was adjudicated to petitioner Douglas Alvir, who obtained a title in his name. In 1973, Douglas filed an ejectment case against Weber’s in-laws occupying the property, which was dismissed. On March 29, 1974, Weber filed a complaint for specific performance and damages against the petitioners.
ISSUE
The primary issue is whether Weber’s cause of action to enforce the 1961 deed of sale had already prescribed when he filed his complaint in 1974.
RULING
Yes, the action had prescribed. The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and dismissed Weber’s complaint. An action upon a written contract prescribes in ten years from the accrual of the cause of action under Article 1144 of the Civil Code. The Court rejected the appellate court’s view that the cause of action accrued only when the vendors’ rights were definitively determined. Instead, it held that under the contract’s clear terms, the vendors’ obligation to convey their rights arose upon Weber’s full payment of the purchase price.
Weber claimed he paid the final P2,000 balance on July 25, 1963. Therefore, his cause of action accrued on that date. Counting the ten-year prescriptive period, he had until July 25, 1973, to file suit. However, he filed his complaint only on March 29, 1974, which was beyond the prescriptive period. The Court was not convinced by Weber’s claim that petitioners’ misrepresentations caused the delay, noting he learned of the developments in the estate proceedings by February 1973 when the ejectment case was filed but still failed to act within the remaining period. Having lost his right to seek judicial relief through prescription, the other constitutional and procedural issues raised by petitioners were rendered moot.
