GR 81269; (July, 1989) (Digest)
G.R. No. 81269 July 19, 1989
LIBERTY COMMERCIAL CENTER, INC., petitioner, vs. PURA FERRER CALLEJA-BLR DIRECTOR/SAMAHANG MANGGA-GAWA NG LIBERTY COMMERCIAL CENTER — ORGANIZED LABOR ASSOCIATION IN LINE INDUSTRIES AND AGRICULTURE (SMLCC-OLALIA-KMU), respondents.
FACTS
Petitioner Liberty Commercial Center, Inc. operates a principal office in Tabaco, Albay, and a branch in Legaspi City. Two separate, duly registered labor unions represent its employees: the Association of Liberty Commercial Center Employees (ALCCE) for Legaspi City and the Liberty Employees Association (LEA) for Tabaco. Both unions, registered on the same date and represented by the same FLAG lawyer, successfully negotiated separate three-year Collective Bargaining Agreements (CBAs) effective December 1, 1986, which were ratified by an overwhelming majority of their respective memberships. Subsequently, respondent union SMLCC-Olalia-KMU filed a petition for direct certification and engaged in picketing. Petitioner contended the petition’s signatories were dismissed employees and that the petition was filed outside the legally prescribed 60-day “freedom period” before the CBA’s expiration.
The Med-Arbiter dismissed SMLCC-Olalia-KMU’s petition for being filed outside the freedom period. However, public respondent BLR Director Pura Ferrer Calleja reversed this decision on appeal, ordering a certification election for the rank-and-file employees of both offices combined, thereby effectively disregarding the two existing CBAs. The Director cast doubt on the legitimacy of the ALCCE and LEA, suggesting they might be “company unions,” despite their valid certificates of registration.
ISSUE
Whether the Bureau of Labor Relations Director erred in ordering a certification election despite the existence of two separate, duly ratified Collective Bargaining Agreements and the petition being filed outside the statutory freedom period.
RULING
Yes, the Supreme Court granted the petition and set aside the BLR Director’s order. The legal logic is anchored on strict compliance with procedural mandates and the presumption of validity accorded to registered unions and executed agreements. First, the law explicitly requires that a petition for certification election must be filed within the 60-day freedom period prior to the expiration of an existing CBA. SMLCC-Olalia-KMU’s petition was filed prematurely, warranting its outright dismissal as ruled by the Med-Arbiter. The BLR Director’s reversal lacked legal basis on this procedural ground alone.
Second, the Court emphasized the authenticity and validity of the two CBAs and the unions that negotiated them. The certificates of registration for ALCCE and LEA were issued by the Department of Labor and Employment and were never successfully assailed or cancelled. In the absence of strong, contrary evidence, the BLR Director’s unsupported doubts about their legitimacy, labeling them as potential “company unions,” constituted a grave abuse of discretion. The CBAs were duly notarized and ratified by majority votes, as evidenced by meeting minutes and certifications. The respondent union failed to substantiate its claim of representation, with petitioner’s uncontroverted assertion that the petition’s signatories were dismissed employees further undermining its standing. Therefore, the order for a certification election was invalid as it disregarded existing, valid bargaining agreements and applicable procedural rules.
