G.R. No. 81162. April 19, 1989.
PEPSI COLA BOTTLING COMPANY OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. JOB GUANZON AND NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (Third Division), respondents.

FACTS

Petitioner Pepsi Cola Bottling Company hired private respondent Job Guanzon as a route salesman in 1965. In June 1979, he was suspended and subjected to an administrative investigation for allegedly misappropriating collections and falsifying invoices. On July 6, 1979, Pepsi served Guanzon a termination letter effective July 17, 1979. A criminal complaint for Estafa through Falsification was also filed but was dismissed by the City Fiscal of Bacolod on May 25, 1984, which found the invoice was not a commercial document and noted Guanzon had settled his financial liability.
On November 14, 1984, Guanzon filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, reinstatement, backwages, and damages with the Labor Arbiter. The Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint, ruling it was barred by the three-year prescriptive period under Article 292 (now 291) of the Labor Code for money claims. On appeal, the NLRC reversed the Labor Arbiter. It held the complaint was principally for illegal dismissal, making Article 1146 of the Civil Code (four-year prescriptive period) applicable. The NLRC reckoned the prescriptive period from May 25, 1984 (dismissal of the criminal case), found the November 1984 filing timely, and ruled the dismissal was without just cause and due process. It awarded three years’ backwages and separation pay.

ISSUE

Whether private respondent Guanzon’s action for illegal dismissal had prescribed.

RULING

Yes, the action had prescribed. The Supreme Court reversed the NLRC decision and reinstated the Labor Arbiter’s dismissal. The Court held that Guanzon’s cause of action accrued on July 17, 1979, the effective date of his termination as stated in the letter he received. The complaint filed on November 14, 1984, was beyond the prescriptive periods under both Article 291 of the Labor Code (three years) and Article 1146 of the Civil Code (four years). The NLRC’s theory that Guanzon was merely preventively suspended until the criminal case’s resolution was untenable, as the termination letter’s clear language and Guanzon’s own complaint alleging “unlawful dismissal” in 1979 confirmed the accrual date.
Furthermore, the defense of prescription was not waived. The NLRC Rules did not specify a period to file a motion to dismiss. Crucially, the complaint’s own allegations showed the action was filed over five years after dismissal, making it apparent on its face that it had prescribed. Established jurisprudence allows a court or tribunal to dismiss a case motu proprio on prescription grounds when the complaint’s own facts reveal the lapse, regardless of procedural timeliness of a motion to dismiss. Therefore, the Labor Arbiter correctly dismissed the complaint.