G.R. No. 80739 August 20, 1992
GRACIA R. JOVEN, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. MANUEL A. PATRON, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the RTC, Branch 59, Lucena City, ROBERTO PAGUIA & FERNANDO LASALA, respondents.

FACTS

Petitioner Gracia R. Joven was the registered owner of three parcels of land mortgaged to the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP). Due to her failure to pay the loan, the mortgage was extrajudicially foreclosed, and the properties were sold at public auction to DBP as the highest bidder on November 17, 1982. After the redemption period expired with no redemption made by Joven, DBP sold the properties to private respondent Roberto Paguia through a deed of sale executed on December 17, 1985. On January 30, 1986, Paguia, through his representative Fernando Lasala, took possession of the properties.
Earlier, on December 3, 1985, Joven filed an action before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Lucena City (Branch 55) for the annulment of the mortgage and its foreclosure, naming DBP and the private respondents as defendants. When her application for a preliminary injunction and restraining order was denied, she filed a complaint for forcible entry with a prayer for a writ of mandatory injunction against the private respondents before the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Lucban-Sampaloc, docketed as Civil Case No. 155.
The MCTC initially dismissed the ejectment case for lack of jurisdiction on May 14, 1986. However, upon Joven’s motion for reconsideration, the MCTC granted it and issued a resolution on July 11, 1986, ordering the private respondents to restore possession to Joven, render an accounting of fruits/products, and reimburse the cost of accounting. On appeal, the RTC (Branch 59) reversed the MCTC resolution, holding that the MCTC had no jurisdiction due to the issue of ownership and that, assuming jurisdiction, the MCTC decision had become final and executory when the July 11, 1986 resolution was rendered. The Court of Appeals sustained the RTC decision in toto.

ISSUE

1. Whether the Municipal Circuit Trial Court had jurisdiction over the ejectment case for forcible entry despite the involvement of a question of ownership.
2. Whether the motion for reconsideration filed by Joven with the MCTC was a prohibited pleading that did not toll the reglementary period to appeal.
3. Whether the private respondents were guilty of forcible entry for taking possession of the properties without judicial authorization.

RULING

1. Yes, the MCTC had jurisdiction. The Supreme Court held that the MCTC retained jurisdiction over the forcible entry case. The mere allegation of ownership in the complaint does not divest the inferior court of jurisdiction, provided the action is essentially for the restoration of possession. Citing Section 33(2) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, the Court emphasized that municipal courts have exclusive original jurisdiction over forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases. Even if the defendant raises the question of ownership, the issue of ownership is resolved only to determine the issue of possession. The fact that Joven had a separate pending action for annulment of mortgage and foreclosure (involving ownership) before the RTC did not defeat the summary remedy of ejectment; it only bolstered the conclusion that the ejectment case did not involve title, as that was the subject of the separate annulment case.
2. No, the motion for reconsideration was not a prohibited pleading and effectively suspended the period to appeal. The Court ruled that the motion for reconsideration filed by Joven was not covered by the prohibition under Section 15(c) (now Section 19(c)) of the Rule on Summary Procedure. The prohibition applies to motions seeking reconsideration of a judgment rendered after trial on the merits. The MCTC’s initial decision dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction was not an adjudication on the merits. Therefore, Joven’s motion for reconsideration, which was not pro forma, had the effect of suspending the running of the period to appeal.
3. Yes, the private respondents were guilty of forcible entry. The Supreme Court held that the purchaser at a foreclosure sale must invoke the aid of the courts and ask for a writ of possession to be legally installed in the property. He cannot take the law into his own hands and enter the property without judicial authorization. While the purchaser need not bring a separate suit for a writ of possession (as it can be obtained through a motion in the foreclosure proceeding), it is essential that he ask for and be granted such a writ. The private respondents’ act of taking possession without judicial authorization constituted forcible entry.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
The petition was GRANTED. The resolution of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Lucban-Sampaloc dated July 11, 1986, in Civil Case No. 155 was REINSTATED. Costs were imposed against the private respondents.