G.R. No. 80599 September 15, 1989
ERNESTINA CRISOLOGO-JOSE, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and RICARDO S. SANTOS, JR., respondents.

FACTS

Ricardo S. Santos, Jr., Vice-President of Mover Enterprises, Inc., signed a corporate check for P45,000 as an alternate signatory, alongside the company president, Atty. Oscar Benares. The check, payable to Ernestina Crisologo-Jose, was issued for a quitclaim over a property. It was later replaced with another check, also signed by Benares and Santos, which was dishonored twice for insufficiency of funds. Consequently, Crisologo-Jose filed a criminal complaint for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 against both signatories.
During the preliminary investigation of the criminal case, Santos, using a cashier’s check provided by Benares, attempted to tender payment of P45,000 to Crisologo-Jose to settle the obligation. Crisologo-Jose refused the payment. Santos then encashed the cashier’s check and consigned the amount with the Clerk of Court. He subsequently filed a civil complaint for consignation. The trial court dismissed the complaint, but the Court of Appeals reversed, holding the consignation valid and reviving the complaint.

ISSUE

The primary issue is whether Santos, as a signatory to the dishonored corporate check, is an accommodation party personally liable for the amount, thereby making his consignation of payment valid under Article 1256 of the Civil Code.

RULING

The Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals’ decision, upholding the validity of the consignation. The Court ruled that Santos is an accommodation party under Section 29 of the Negotiable Instruments Law. An accommodation party is one who signs an instrument without receiving value, for the purpose of lending his name to another. The requisites are present: Santos signed the check as a corporate officer, received no direct value for it, and signed to accommodate the transaction for the benefit of the spouses Ong, the clients of President Benares.
His liability is personal and solidary to a holder for value, irrespective of his representative capacity. By lending his name, he effectively became a surety. Therefore, he was a debtor obligated to pay the check’s amount to Crisologo-Jose. When she unjustifiably refused his valid tender of payment, he had the right to consign the money with the court to extinguish his liability. The consignation was proper as the obligation was due and the refusal was without just cause. The Court, however, modified the appellate decision by setting aside its unnecessary pronouncements regarding the pending criminal case, clarifying that issues of criminal liability under B.P. 22 are separate and distinct from the civil consignation.