G.R. No. 80223 February 5, 1993
B.E. SAN DIEGO, INC., petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS (11th Division), HON. TERESITA DIZON-CAPULONG, in her capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch 172, Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, and ROSALIA DE JESUS, respondents.

FACTS

On March 3, 1986, petitioner B.E. San Diego, Inc. filed an action for recovery of possession of a parcel of land in Valenzuela, Metro Manila, against private respondent Rosalia de Jesus. In her answer and subsequent motion to dismiss, De Jesus argued that the land was included in a government Zonal Improvement Program (ZIP) site and thus subject to the provisions of P.D. 2016, which prohibits eviction of qualified occupants. The trial court initially denied the motion to dismiss on November 3, 1986, ruling that under P.D. 2016, a tenant or occupant family is protected from eviction only if they have been residing on the land for ten years or more reckoned from the date of issuance of P.D. 1517 on June 11, 1978. Since ten years from 1978 would be 1988, De Jesus was not yet protected. Judge Teresita Dizon-Capulong later granted De Jesus a 5-day extension to file a motion for reconsideration, but the motion was filed 73 days late, on March 5, 1987. On March 25, 1987, the trial court reconsidered its earlier order, relying on an interpretation from the National Housing Authority (NHA) that the ten-year period should be reckoned backward from 1978 (i.e., possession since 1968 or earlier). The petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied. The petitioner then filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the Court of Appeals, which was dismissed on August 10, 1987. The Court of Appeals sustained the trial court’s reliance on the NHA’s interpretation. The petitioner elevated the case to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE

1. Whether the respondent trial court’s orders (granting an extension to file a motion for reconsideration and later accepting the tardy motion) were procedurally sanctioned or constituted grave abuse of discretion.
2. Whether the ten-year period of occupancy mentioned in Section 2 of P.D. 2016 is to be counted backward from 1978 (as contended by respondents) or forward from 1978 (as contended by petitioner).

RULING

1. On the procedural issue, the Supreme Court held that the respondent court erred in granting the 5-day extension to file a motion for reconsideration, as such extensions were barred by the ruling in Habaluyas Enterprises, Inc. v. Japson. Furthermore, the motion for reconsideration was filed more than two months after the extended period, making it tardy. However, the Court chose to disregard these procedural lapses in the interest of substantive justice, as the case involves the important social justice policy of urban land reform and housing.
2. On the substantive issue, the Supreme Court held that the ten-year period under Section 2 of P.D. 2016 should be reckoned backward from 1978, the year P.D. 1517 was issued. This means a qualified tenant or occupant must have resided on the land for ten years or more prior to June 11, 1978. The Court agreed with the interpretation of the National Housing Authority, the implementing agency, as this interpretation effectuates the purpose of the decrees to protect qualified residents from immediate eviction. Counting the period forward from 1978 would render the decree inoperative until 1988 and negate its intent to prevent unscrupulous landowners from evicting tenants. The Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals and directed the trial court to proceed with the trial to determine if De Jesus is a qualified resident under P.D. 2016.