G.R. No. 79404 & G.R. No. 80045. January 27, 1989.
SPOUSES FELICIANO BEJER and GLORIA BEJER, petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and SPOUSES SOLANO SAMAR and “JOHN DOE/S”, respondents. (G.R. No. 79404) and SPOUSES FELICIANO BEJER and GLORIA BEJER, petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and SPOUSES ELIAS ESPLANO and “JOHN DOE/S”, respondents. (G.R. No. 80045).

FACTS

Petitioners, the Bejer spouses, own a property in Malate, Manila. They verbally leased portions of it to the respondent Samar and Esplano spouses on a month-to-month basis. In 1985, petitioners notified respondents of their need to repossess the premises for family use and to pay accrued rentals. Upon respondents’ refusal to vacate and pay, petitioners filed ejectment complaints in the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Manila in April 1986. The MeTC ruled in favor of the petitioners, a decision affirmed by the Regional Trial Court (RTC).
The respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals, raising the affirmative defense that the complaints were premature for non-compliance with the conciliation requirement under P.D. 1508 (Katarungang Pambarangay Law). They argued that since the petitioners were temporarily staying at their children’s apartment in Pandacan, Manila, at the time of filing, they were “actual residents” of the same city as the respondents, thus subject to the barangay conciliation process. The Court of Appeals agreed, set aside the lower courts’ decisions, and dismissed the ejectment cases for lack of cause of action.

ISSUE

Does P.D. 1508, which mandates barangay conciliation as a precondition for filing a case in court, apply when the plaintiffs are permanent residents of another province but are temporarily residing for a transient purpose in the same city where the defendants reside?

RULING

No. The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and reinstated the RTC decisions. The legal logic centers on the interpretation of “actual residence” under P.D. 1508. The law requires that parties must be “actually residing” in the same city or municipality for its conciliation process to be compulsory. The Court distinguished “residence” from mere temporary or transient physical presence. “Residence” implies a more permanent abode, the domicile or permanent home, whereas temporary stay for a specific purpose, like the petitioners’ visits to their children in Manila, does not constitute “actual residence” as contemplated by the law.
The Court reasoned that applying P.D. 1508 to transient visitors would lead to absurd and impractical results not intended by the law. It would force individuals with no real community ties to a barangay to undergo its conciliation process before they could file suit in their actual domicile, undermining the law’s purpose of promoting amicable settlement within a stable community. Since the petitioners were permanent residents of Batangas and only transient in Manila, they were not “actual residents” of the same barangay as the respondents. Therefore, the compulsory barangay conciliation was not a prerequisite for filing the ejectment suits. The failure to undergo it did not render their complaints premature.