GR 78755; (July, 1989) (Digest)
G.R. No. 78755 July 19, 1989
Golden Farms, Inc., petitioner, vs. The Honorable Director Pura Ferrer-Calleja, Bureau of Labor Relations and National Federation of Labor, respondents.
FACTS
Petitioner Golden Farms, Inc. is a corporation engaged in banana production. Private respondent National Federation of Labor (NFL) is the exclusive bargaining agent for the company’s rank-and-file employees under an existing Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA). NFL subsequently filed a Petition for Direct Certification Election or Recognition on behalf of a separate group of monthly-paid employees, including cashiers, purchasers, personnel officers, foremen, and confidential employees like accounting personnel. Golden Farms opposed this petition, arguing these employees, by the nature of their positions, performed managerial or confidential functions and were thus excluded from the rank-and-file bargaining unit and the existing CBA.
The Med-Arbiter dismissed the petition for certification election. However, in the dismissal order, the Med-Arbiter directed Golden Farms to negotiate a supplementary CBA with NFL to include these disputed employees in the existing bargaining unit. This directive was affirmed by the Director of the Bureau of Labor Relations. Golden Farms challenged this order, contending the Med-Arbiter had no authority to compel such negotiation and that the involved employees were legally disqualified from joining the rank-and-file union.
ISSUE
1. Whether a Med-Arbiter has the authority to direct an employer to enter into a supplemental collective bargaining agreement.
2. Whether employees performing managerial or confidential functions can compel management to include them in a collective bargaining agreement with the rank-and-file union.
RULING
The Supreme Court ruled in favor of Golden Farms and nullified the directive. On the first issue, the Court held that a Med-Arbiter, in a certification election proceeding, lacks the authority to compel parties to negotiate or execute a collective bargaining agreement. The Med-Arbiter’s power is limited to determining the appropriate bargaining unit and conducting the election to ascertain the employees’ representative. The order to negotiate a supplemental CBA exceeded this jurisdictional limit.
On the second issue, the Court held that the employees in question—specifically those performing managerial functions and those in confidential positions—are legally disqualified from joining the rank-and-file bargaining unit. Citing Article 212(k) of the Labor Code, managerial employees are defined as those vested with powers to execute management policies or effectively recommend managerial actions. Confidential employees, such as accounting personnel and radio operators, are those who handle sensitive data where a conflict of interest would arise if they joined the union. The Court reiterated the doctrine from Bulletin Publishing Co. v. Sanchez that allowing such employees into the rank-and-file union could lead to company domination or espionage, undermining the bargaining process. The existing CBA itself expressly excluded these categories. Therefore, they cannot be compelled into the bargaining unit, and the order for their inclusion was a disregard of the CBA’s terms and established legal principles.
