G.R. No. 77368 October 5, 1993
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HON. JOSE C. DE GUZMAN, PRESIDING JUDGE OF REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF QUEZON CITY, BRANCH 93, AND SPOUSES DANILO A. ALCANTARA AND ISABELITA ESGUERRA-ALCANTARA, respondents.

FACTS

On September 9, 1985, a robbery was committed in Quezon City at the house of Jose L. Obillos, Sr., where valuable jewelry was stolen. An information for robbery was filed in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 101. Subsequently, an information for violation of Presidential Decree No. 1612 (the Anti-Fencing Law) was filed in the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 93, against spouses Danilo A. Alcantara and Isabelita Esguerra-Alcantara, from whom the stolen jewelry was recovered in Antipolo, Rizal. The accused filed a motion to quash the information for fencing, arguing that the court lacked jurisdiction because the alleged act of fencing took place in Antipolo, Rizal, outside Quezon City. The respondent judge granted the motion and quashed the information, ruling that the crime of fencing must be instituted and tried in the municipality or province where the offense was committed. The prosecution’s motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence, the People of the Philippines filed this petition for certiorari and mandamus, arguing that fencing is a “continuing offense” and that since an essential element is the commission of robbery (which occurred in Quezon City), the information was properly filed there.

ISSUE

Is the crime of “fencing” a continuing offense that allows the filing of an information in the place where the robbery or theft is committed, and not necessarily where the property is later found to have been acquired?

RULING

No. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition and affirmed the orders of the respondent judge. The Court held that the crimes of robbery and fencing are two distinct offenses. Fencing is not a continuing offense. A “continuous crime” is a single crime consisting of a series of acts arising from a single criminal intent. Robbery is the taking of personal property with intent to gain by means of violence or intimidation. Fencing is the act of buying, receiving, possessing, keeping, acquiring, concealing, selling, or disposing of property known to be derived from robbery or theft, with intent to gain. The law on fencing does not require the accused to have participated in the robbery or theft, and the crime of robbery does not depend on fencing to be consummated. While the property in fencing must have been previously taken by robbery or theft, the place where the robbery occurred is inconsequential to the venue for fencing. The Court analogized that just as in bigamy (which presupposes a prior marriage), the case is not triable at the place where the prior marriage was contracted. Therefore, the proper venue for fencing is the place where the act of fencing itself was committed, which in this case was Antipolo, Rizal, not Quezon City. The respondent judge did not gravely abuse his discretion in quashing the information for lack of jurisdiction.