GR 75154; (February, 1990) (Digest)
G.R. No. 75154-55 February 6, 1990
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ROGER VICTOR, ROBERTO MONTEBON, and CEFERINO GUNEDA, defendants, CEFERINO GUNEDA, defendant-appellant.
FACTS
Ceferino Guneda, along with Roger Victor and Roberto Montebon, was charged with Robbery with Homicide and Illegal Possession of Firearm. The prosecution established that Guneda, a resident of Boljoon, Cebu, conceived a plan to rob an American, Charles Turner. He enlisted Victor and Montebon, the latter bringing a .38 caliber homemade revolver. On October 16, 1984, after a failed robbery attempt at another residence, the trio proceeded to Turner’s cottage. Upon entry, Montebon, allegedly upon Guneda’s instruction, shot Turner at the back of the head. The group then ransacked the cottage and fled with the victim’s belongings. Turner was found dead the next morning. During trial, the prosecution rested its case against Guneda, who then filed a Demurrer to Evidence challenging the sufficiency of the prosecution’s proof.
ISSUE
The core issue is whether the trial court erred in convicting Guneda of Robbery with Homicide based on the prosecution’s evidence, considering his claim that the filing of his Demurrer to Evidence should not have constituted a waiver of his right to present evidence.
RULING
The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction. On the substantive aspect, the Court found the prosecution evidence sufficient to establish Guneda’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt for Robbery with Homicide. The testimonial evidence, particularly from co-accused Victor who turned state witness, clearly detailed Guneda’s central role as the planner and instigator who specifically instructed Montebon to kill Turner because the victim knew him. This evidence, corroborated by the circumstances and the necropsy report, proved conspiracy among the accused, making each liable for the acts of the others.
On the procedural issue, the Court ruled that Guneda effectively waived his right to present evidence by filing a Demurrer to Evidence under the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, which were already in effect at the time of its filing. Rule 119, Section 15 explicitly states that filing such a motion constitutes a waiver of the right to present evidence and submits the case for judgment based on the prosecution’s evidence. Guneda’s Demurrer itself cited this specific rule, demonstrating his understanding and intention to invoke it. Having voluntarily chosen this procedural course, he could not later reverse his position and demand to present evidence after his Demurrer was denied. The trial court, therefore, correctly rendered judgment based solely on the prosecution’s evidence, which was deemed sufficient to support a conviction.