G.R. No. 75112 October 16, 1990
Filamer Christian Institute, petitioner, vs. Honorable Court of Appeals, Honorable Enrique P. Suplico, in his capacity as Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch XIV, Roxas City and the late Potenciano Kapunan, Sr., as substituted by his heirs, respondents.

FACTS

On October 20, 1977, the Pinoy jeep owned by petitioner Filamer Christian Institute, driven by Daniel Funtecha, struck Potenciano Kapunan, Sr., an elderly pedestrian, causing him serious injuries. At the time of the accident, only one headlight of the vehicle was functioning. Funtecha, who only possessed a student driver’s permit, was driving after having persuaded the authorized driver, Allan Masa—a full-time employee of Filamer—to turn over the wheel. Both Funtecha and Masa fled the scene. Kapunan, Sr. successfully prosecuted a criminal case against Funtecha for reckless imprudence, while reserving his right to file an independent civil action.
Kapunan, Sr. subsequently filed a civil case for damages against Filamer, Funtecha, and Agustin Masa (Filamer’s president and Allan’s father) in his personal capacity. The Regional Trial Court found Filamer, Funtecha, and the non-party Allan Masa jointly and severally liable for damages, holding Filamer primarily liable as employer. The Court of Appeals affirmed this decision. Filamer elevated the case to the Supreme Court, arguing it could not be held liable for Funtecha’s actions.

ISSUE

Whether petitioner Filamer Christian Institute can be held vicariously liable, under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, for the damages caused by Daniel Funtecha’s negligent driving.

RULING

The Supreme Court ruled in the negative and absolved Filamer from liability. The Court clarified that for an employer to be held vicariously liable for an employee’s tort under Article 2180, the employee must have been acting within the scope of his assigned tasks at the time the tort was committed. The evidence established that Daniel Funtecha was a working student whose duty was limited to janitorial services for two hours each morning. Driving the institute’s vehicle at 6:30 in the evening was unequivocally outside the scope of his employment. He was engaged in a personal undertaking, having taken the wheel from the authorized driver without the employer’s knowledge or consent. Consequently, his wrongful act was his own and could not be imputed to Filamer.
The Court further noted that while Allan Masa, the authorized driver and a full-time employee, was negligent in entrusting the vehicle to Funtecha, he was not impleaded as a defendant in the civil case. A judgment finding liability against a non-party, as the trial court did, violates fundamental due process. Therefore, Filamer could not be held derivatively liable for the acts of an employee who was not a party to the suit. The decision of the Court of Appeals was set aside, and the complaint against Filamer was dismissed for lack of cause of action.