G.R. No. 72976 July 9, 1990
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. FLORENTINO EDUARTE @ Tinong, defendant-appellant.

FACTS

The prosecution’s evidence established that on the night of December 4, 1984, in Dolores, Abra, a quarrel erupted between Fredeswindo Eduarte and his brother-in-law, Roberto Trinidad. Fredeswindo, suspecting his wife of infidelity, became violent and thrust a scissor at Roberto. After the scissor was wrestled away, Roberto left to seek police help. Upon returning, Roberto saw Fredeswindo lying on the road. As Roberto alighted from his jeep to assist him, the appellant, Florentino Eduarte, emerged from beside the road and shot Roberto, causing his death. Florentino subsequently evaded arrest.
The defense presented a contrary version. Appellant Florentino claimed he was working when informed his brother Fredeswindo was being killed. He rushed to the scene with a gun, where he allegedly saw the victim, Roberto Trinidad, clubbing his already bloodied and prostrate brother. Asserting he acted to defend his brother’s life, Florentino shot Roberto. He invoked the justifying circumstance of defense of a relative under the Revised Penal Code.

ISSUE

The core issue is whether the accused-appellant, Florentino Eduarte, successfully proved the justifying circumstance of defense of a relative to exonerate him from criminal liability for the killing of Roberto Trinidad.

RULING

The Supreme Court modified the trial court’s decision, convicting the appellant of Homicide instead of Murder. The Court rejected the claim of defense of a relative. For this defense to be valid, the person defended must be unlawfully aggressed, and the means employed to prevent or repel the aggression must be reasonably necessary. The Court found the appellant’s actions unreasonable. The evidence indicated Fredeswindo was already lying motionless and bloodied when the appellant arrived and shot the victim, who was unarmed and in the act of offering help. The means employed—shooting the victim—was disproportionate and unnecessary under the circumstances, as the alleged aggression against Fredeswindo had already ceased. Furthermore, the appellant’s immediate flight after the incident, without checking on his brother’s condition, undermined his claim of a defensive purpose and was considered indicative of guilt.
Regarding the qualifying circumstance of treachery, the Court also found it absent. The mode of attack was not shown to have been consciously adopted to ensure the execution of the killing without risk to the appellant. His act of procuring a gun and rushing to the scene was deemed more impulsive than a product of a calculated plan to employ treacherous means. Consequently, the crime was homicide, not murder. The appellant was sentenced under the Indeterminate Sentence Law to an imprisonment term of eight years and one day of prision mayor as minimum to seventeen years and four months of reclusion temporal as maximum, and ordered to pay indemnity to the victim’s heirs.