GR 72138; (January, 1990) (Digest)
G.R. No. 72138 and G.R. No. 72373 ; January 22, 1990
SPS. FELICIDAD M. ALVENDIA and JESUS F. ALVENDIA, petitioners, vs. HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, et al., respondents. / BONIFACIO BONAMY, petitioner, vs. HON. EDGARDO L. PARAS, et al., respondents.
FACTS
The consolidated cases originated from a collection suit filed by Bonifacio Bonamy against spouses Jesus and Felicidad Alvendia for construction materials worth P107,481.50. The parties submitted a Compromise Agreement to the trial court, which was approved as a judgment. The agreement stipulated that the Alvendias, jointly with their family corporation, would pay the obligation from the first releases of funds from the GSIS for housing units sold by the corporation, after first satisfying a P47,000 assignment to another creditor. Bonamy later moved for execution, alleging the Alvendias failed to submit a project to GSIS, preventing fulfillment. The trial court granted execution. After an alias writ, the sheriff levied on the Alvendias’ leasehold rights over a fishpond, which was sold at auction to Bonamy for P100,000. The Alvendias moved to quash the execution and annul the sale, but the trial court denied their motion and confirmed the levy and sale.
The Alvendias filed a petition for certiorari with the Intermediate Appellate Court (IAC), arguing the execution was void as it levied on properties not mentioned in the compromise judgment and made them solely liable instead of their corporation. The IAC dismissed their petition. The Alvendias then filed a motion for reconsideration and a separate motion to pay the judgment in cash, which the IAC granted in a subsequent resolution, allowing them to pay Bonamy the judgment amount in cash and setting aside the execution sale. Bonamy challenged this resolution via a petition for certiorari and prohibition.
ISSUE
The primary issue is whether the IAC acted with grave abuse of discretion in granting the Alvendias’ motion to pay the judgment in cash and in setting aside the execution sale of the leasehold rights.
RULING
The Supreme Court ruled that the IAC committed grave abuse of discretion. The legal logic is anchored on the finality and immutability of judgments and the proper scope of execution. The compromise agreement, having been judicially approved, had the force of res judicata and was immediately executory. The trial court’s order of execution was proper because the agreement contained a resolutory condition (payment from GSIS releases) that was entirely dependent on the Alvendias’ act of submitting a finished project. Their failure to perform this act rendered the obligation due and demandable. The Alvendias did not timely appeal the order of execution; thus, it became final.
Consequently, the subsequent execution proceedings, including the levy and sale of the leasehold rights—which were properties of the judgment debtors—were valid. A judgment for money can be satisfied from any property of the debtor, not merely those referenced in the judgment. The IAC’s resolution allowing payment in cash and setting aside the consummated auction sale, after the Alvendias had lost their right to appeal and the property had been registered in Bonamy’s name, constituted an unwarranted alteration of a final judgment and disturbed vested rights. The Court reinstated the trial court’s orders confirming the validity of the levy and sale. However, Bonamy was ordered to return the excess of P12,518.50, representing the difference between the auction price (P100,000) and the actual obligation (P87,481.50, after deducting a P20,000 partial payment).
