GR 69260; (December, 1989) (Digest)
G.R. No. 69260 December 22, 1989
Municipality of Biñan, petitioner, vs. Hon. Jose Mar Garcia, Judge of the Regional Trial Court at Biñan, Laguna (Branch XXXIV, Region IV), and Erlinda Francisco, respondents.
FACTS
The Municipality of Biñan filed a complaint for eminent domain to expropriate several parcels of land, including one owned by respondent Erlinda Francisco, for a new public market. Francisco filed a pleading titled “Motion to Dismiss” under Rule 67, Section 3 of the Rules of Court, which serves as an answer in expropriation cases, raising objections such as vagueness, constitutional violations, and the existence of a pre-existing locational clearance from the Human Settlements Regulatory Commission (HSRC) for a commercial complex on her property. The trial court granted Francisco’s subsequent “Motion for Separate Trial.” During this separate proceeding, the court reversed the normal order of trial, allowing Francisco to present her evidence first over the Municipality’s objection that this procedure was irregular.
The respondent judge, after hearing Francisco’s evidence—which primarily consisted of the HSRC locational clearance—issued an order dismissing the expropriation complaint as against her. The court ruled that the clearance granted Francisco a vested right that constituted a legal bar to the expropriation. The Municipality filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied. The Municipality then filed a petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court, arguing grave abuse of discretion in the procedural handling and substantive ruling of the case.
ISSUE
The core issues were: (1) whether the trial court could treat a Rule 67 “Motion to Dismiss” as a Rule 16 motion and reverse the order of trial to hear it preliminarily; (2) whether an HSRC locational clearance constitutes a bar to an expropriation proceeding; and (3) the applicable period for appealing orders in eminent domain cases.
RULING
The Supreme Court granted the petition, annulling the challenged orders. On procedure, the Court held that a pleading filed under Rule 67, Section 3 is not an ordinary motion to dismiss under Rule 16 but a responsive pleading that takes the place of an answer. Therefore, it is improper for a trial court to conduct a separate, preliminary hearing on such a pleading and dismiss the case based solely on the evidence presented by the defendant. The correct procedure is for the court to proceed to trial in the usual sequence, where the plaintiff has the burden of proving its right to expropriate. The respondent judge’s act of reversing the order of trial and dismissing the case based only on Francisco’s evidence constituted a denial of due process to the Municipality and a grave abuse of discretion.
On the substantive issue, the Court ruled that an HSRC locational clearance does not create a vested right that can block the government’s exercise of eminent domain. The power of eminent domain is a fundamental state prerogative, superior to administrative issuances like a locational clearance. Such clearance pertains to land use regulation but cannot preclude the state from taking private property for public use upon payment of just compensation. Finally, the Court clarified that for purposes of appeal, an eminent domain case is not one where “multiple appeals” are allowed under the Interim Rules. Thus, the period to appeal an interlocutory order in such a case is not thirty days but remains subject to the ordinary rules.