GR 66555; (March, 1996) (Digest)
G.R. No. 66555 March 7, 1996
SPOUSES LEONCIO MEJARES and EPIFANIA LARUMBE, petitioners, vs. HON. JUAN Y. REYES, in his official capacity as Presiding Judge, RTC-Cebu, Branch XIV, and MANUEL ADARNA, respondents.
FACTS
Petitioners Spouses Mejares had been occupying a portion of an agricultural lot in Minglanilla, Cebu, and built their house thereon by tolerance of the previous owner. Respondent Manuel Adarna purchased the lot in April 1978. Upon petitioners’ plea, Adarna allowed them to stay without rent, provided they would vacate and remove their house when he needed the land. In May 1979, Adarna notified petitioners of his need for the lot. Upon their refusal to vacate, Adarna filed a criminal complaint for violation of the Anti-Squatting Law (P.D. 772). The Regional Trial Court convicted the petitioners, sentencing them to pay a fine and to remove their house from the land. Petitioners filed this Petition for Certiorari, arguing their conviction was erroneous.
ISSUE
The primary issue is whether the petitioners can be held criminally liable under P.D. 772 for refusing to vacate the agricultural land after the owner’s demand, given their initial entry was by tolerance of the previous owner and their continued stay was initially permitted by the new owner.
RULING
The Supreme Court granted the petition and set aside the conviction. The Court clarified that for a conviction under P.D. 772, the prosecution must prove the accused succeeded in occupying the land “through force, intimidation, or threat, or by taking advantage of the absence or tolerance of the owner.” The evidence showed the petitioners’ original entry and continued possession were with the consent and tolerance of both the former and the new owner, Adarna. Their possession only became unlawful upon their refusal to leave after Adarna’s demand. However, this subsequent refusal does not constitute the criminal act of “succeeding in occupying” as defined by the decree. The law penalizes the initial act of unlawful entry or taking possession, not the mere failure to leave after a lawful possession becomes untenable. Since the prosecution failed to prove the essential element that the occupancy was obtained without consent or against the will of the owner at its inception, the conviction cannot stand. The Court noted it was not ruling on the legality of possession but solely on the propriety of the criminal conviction.