G.R. No. 66437 , December 4, 1989
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. JAIME GUEVARRA Y ARCEGA, ET AL., defendants, VERGEL BUSTAMANTE alias “DAN SAKSAK”, defendant-appellant.

FACTS

The case originated from an Amended Information charging multiple accused, including Vergel Bustamante alias “Dan Saksak,” with Kidnapping. The prosecution evidence established that on April 8, 1980, armed men entered the house of spouses Luisito and Priscilla Cruz in Gapan, Nueva Ecija, robbed them, and then forcibly took Priscilla. She was placed in her own car, driven by Bustamante, and transported towards Manila. During the journey, the men informed her she was being held for a P50,000 ransom. The car later broke down in Bulacan, and the group transferred to a hired truck. At the Paxton Hotel in Valenzuela, Bulacan, the men abandoned Priscilla, with one stating the kidnapping “did not materialize.” She was later brought home by the truck driver. Bustamante was subsequently identified by Priscilla Cruz in a police lineup.
The appellant, Vergel Bustamante, denied involvement and presented an alibi, claiming he was in Caloocan City at the time of the incident. The trial court convicted Bustamante of Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention and initially imposed the death penalty. Following the 1987 Constitution ’s prohibition of the death penalty, the penalty was automatically reduced to reclusion perpetua, and Bustamante elected to continue the case as an appeal.

ISSUE

The primary issues were: (1) whether the trial court erred in allowing the amendment of the Information to correctly name Vergel Bustamante as “Dan Saksak”; and (2) whether the crime committed was kidnapping for ransom under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code or simple kidnapping of a female.

RULING

The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction but modified the legal qualification of the offense. On the first issue, the Court found no error in the amendment. The trial court had sufficient basis to conclude “Vergel Bustamante” and “Dan Saksak” were the same person, as shown by subpoenas and jail records from prior related cases using the alias. The amendment was merely formal and did not prejudice the appellant’s substantial rights.
On the substantive issue, the Court held that the appellant could only be convicted of simple kidnapping of a female under Article 267(4) of the Revised Penal Code, not kidnapping for ransom. The legal logic is anchored on the constitutional right to be informed of the nature of the accusation. The Amended Information alleged kidnapping but did not specifically allege the purpose of extorting ransom. While the victim testified the kidnappers mentioned a ransom demand, no actual demand was communicated to her family. Crucially, an accused cannot be convicted of an offense more serious than that charged in the information. Since the information did not allege the element of ransom, a conviction for the higher offense of kidnapping for ransom was legally impermissible. The aggravating circumstances of using a motor vehicle and the aid of armed men were properly appreciated. Consequently, applying Article 267(4) and considering the constitutional mandate, the penalty of reclusion perpetua was correctly imposed. The appealed judgment was affirmed with this modification.