GR 66038; (March, 1989) (Digest)
G.R. No. L-66038. March 16, 1989.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. VICENTE LUALHATI, defendant-appellant.
FACTS
Appellant Vicente Lualhati was charged with the rape of Josephine Dimaunahan, the 11-year-old daughter of his common-law wife, allegedly committed in or about June 1978 in Candelaria, Quezon. The information filed by the Provincial Fiscal specified a single offense. However, the original complaint filed by the victim referenced acts “sometime prior and subsequent” to June 1978, prompting the appellant to file a motion to dismiss on the ground of duplicity. The trial court denied this motion, noting that the operative information charged only one offense and that the victim’s attached sworn statement clarified the specific incident. After his arraignment, the appellant filed another motion to dismiss based on an affidavit of desistance executed by the victim, her mother, and her grandmother, who had expressly pardoned him.
ISSUE
The core issues were: (1) whether the complaint was void for allegedly charging multiple offenses, and (2) whether the pardon granted by the victim and her maternal relatives extinguished the criminal liability, notwithstanding the objection of the victim’s biological father.
RULING
The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction. On the first issue, the complaint was not void. Any ambiguity in the handwritten complaint regarding the number of incidents was cured by the victim’s detailed sworn statement attached thereto, which specifically referred to the abuse occurring before the start of classes in June 1978. The Court cited People vs. Babasa, holding that such an affidavit may be considered part of the complaint. Since the formal information upon which the trial proceeded charged only one offense committed “in or about the month of June 1978,” there was no fatal duplicity.
On the second issue, the pardon was ineffective to extinguish criminal liability. The crime of rape, classified as a private offense under Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code, requires a complaint by the offended party or her parents, grandparents, or guardian. While pardon by these persons can bar the initiation of prosecution, the established doctrine from People vs. Miranda is that a pardon given after the filing of the complaint in court does not abate the already-instituted criminal action. The only act that extinguishes the action under Article 344 is marriage between the offender and the offended party. Here, the pardon was executed after the complaint was filed. Furthermore, the victim’s father, who possessed parental authority despite allegedly abandoning her, objected to the pardon and insisted on prosecution. The trial court correctly denied the motion to dismiss. The appellant’s admission of repeated carnal knowledge with the minor victim, whom he treated as a daughter, established statutory rape. The decision imposing reclusion perpetua was affirmed, with an additional award of moral damages.