GR 60690; (November, 1989) (Digest)
G.R. No. 60690 November 24, 1989
VIRGINIA JORGE and ANITA VERGARA, petitioners, vs. HON. FRANCISCO Z. CONSOLACION, EMILIO MATULAC, HIS AGENTS AND REPRESENTATIVES, and the PROVINCIAL SHERIFF OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF DAVAO CITY, respondents.
FACTS
This case originated from a dispute between sisters Concepcion and Nieves Palma Gil over a parcel of land. In Civil Case No. 1160, the court ordered Nieves to cede 256.20 square meters to Concepcion. During execution, the sheriff erroneously carved out a specific portion, leading to a Supreme Court resolution nullifying the act and remanding the case. Meanwhile, Concepcion sold portions of the property (Lots 59-C-1 and 59-C-2) to Illuminada Pacetes, whose title was eventually confirmed. These lots were later sold to Constancio Maglana and then to private respondent Emilio Matulac.
Petitioners Virginia Jorge and Anita Vergara entered into a lease agreement over a 218-square-meter portion of the same land with Nieves Palma Gil Villarica on May 10, 1977. After the 1954 decision became final and executory, and upon Matulac’s motion, respondent Judge Francisco Z. Consolacion issued writs of demolition in 1982 targeting the petitioners’ structures on the land.
ISSUE
Whether the respondent judge acted with authority in issuing writs of execution and demolition against the petitioners, who were not parties to the original case, without a separate ejectment action.
RULING
The Supreme Court ruled that the respondent judge acted within his authority. The legal logic is anchored on the finality of the judgment in Civil Case No. 1160 and the principle of succession of rights. The Court affirmed that the 1954 decision had long become final and executory. Emilio Matulac, as a successor-in-interest to the original plaintiff Concepcion (through Pacetes and Maglana), was subrogated to all her rights and was the real party in interest entitled to seek execution. The Court found that the petitioners’ possession was derived solely from a lease with the losing party, Nieves, who had been adjudged not to be the owner of the specific portions (Lots 59-C-1 and 59-C-2) now owned by Matulac.
Consequently, petitioners were possessors without any legal right. The power of the court in execution proceedings extends to the enforcement of the judgment’s substance. Since the judgment ordered the transfer of a specific area, the court could issue ancillary writs, such as demolition, to place the prevailing party in possession, especially against those holding under the losing party who unlawfully withheld the property. A separate ejectment action was unnecessary as the petitioners’ rights were merely derivative of and co-terminous with Nieves’s voidable possession. They had no independent right that could block the execution of a final judgment against their lessor. The demolition was a proper incident to give effect to the final decree of ownership and possession.
