G.R. No. 60690 November 24, 1989
VIRGINIA JORGE and ANITA VERGARA, petitioners, vs. HON. FRANCISCO Z. CONSOLACION, EMILIO MATULAC, HIS AGENTS AND REPRESENTATIVES, and the PROVINCIAL SHERIFF OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF DAVAO CITY, respondents.

FACTS

This case originated from a dispute between sisters Concepcion and Nieves Palma Gil over a portion of land covered by TCT No. T-432. In Civil Case No. 1160, the trial court ordered Nieves to cede 256.20 square meters to Concepcion. During execution, the sheriff erroneously carved out a specific portion, leading to a Supreme Court resolution nullifying the act and remanding the case. Meanwhile, Concepcion sold her designated lots (59-C-1 and 59-C-2) to Iluminada Pacetes, who later sold them to Constancio Maglana, and eventually to private respondent Emilio Matulac. The Supreme Court, in related proceedings, affirmed these transfers and the finality of the original 1954 decision.
Petitioners Virginia Jorge and Anita Vergara entered into a lease agreement over a 218-square-meter portion of the land with Nieves Palma Gil Villarica in 1977. After Matulac acquired the lots, he moved for execution. The respondent judge issued a writ of execution, a writ of demolition, and a special order of demolition against the structures erected by the petitioners.

ISSUE

Whether the respondent judge acted with authority in issuing the writ and special order of demolition against the petitioners, who were not parties to the original case, without a separate ejectment action.

RULING

The Supreme Court ruled that the respondent judge acted within his authority. The legal logic is anchored on the finality of the judgment in Civil Case No. 1160 and the principle of subrogation. The Court affirmed that the 1954 decision had long become final and executory. Emilio Matulac, as the successor-in-interest of the original plaintiff Concepcion (through a chain of valid sales confirmed by the Court), was subrogated to all her rights and was the real party in interest entitled to seek execution. The power of the court in execution cannot be rigidly confined to the literal dispositive portion of a decades-old judgment when the losing party has consistently failed to comply. The issuance of the demolition order was a necessary and logical consequence to enforce the judgment and deliver possession to the prevailing party.
Petitioners, as mere lessees of the losing party Nieves, derived no better right than their lessor. Since Nieves was adjudged to have no ownership over the specific portion and had illegally withheld possession, the petitioners’ occupancy was likewise devoid of legal basis. They were not entitled to the protection of the law as against the registered owner. A separate action for ejectment was unnecessary because the execution proceeding, by virtue of the final judgment declaring ownership and the right to possession, already provided the proper remedy to oust occupants holding under the defeated party. The demolition of the structures was justified under the court’s inherent power to enforce its final decisions completely and effectively.