GR 59568; (January, 1990) (Digest)
G.R. Nos. L-59568-76; January 11, 1990
PETER NIERRAS, petitioner, vs. HON. AUXENCIO C. DACUYCUY and HON. ANTONIO S. LOPEZ, in their capacity as Presiding Judge, Branch IV, Court of First Instance of Leyte, Palo, Leyte, and City Fiscal of Tacloban City, Leyte, respectively, respondents.
FACTS
Petitioner Peter Nierras was charged with nine counts of estafa under Article 315(2-d) of the Revised Penal Code for issuing bouncing checks to Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation in payment for oil products delivered simultaneously with the checks. These checks were dishonored upon presentment because his bank account was already closed. Prior to these estafa cases, Nierras had already been charged with nine counts of violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 (the Bouncing Checks Law) for issuing the same checks. He pleaded not guilty to both sets of charges. After his arraignment in the estafa cases, Nierras moved to withdraw his plea and filed a motion to quash, arguing that prosecuting him for estafa after the BP 22 charges would place him in double jeopardy. The respondent judge denied the motion to quash, prompting Nierras to file this petition for certiorari.
ISSUE
Whether the filing of separate criminal informations for estafa under the Revised Penal Code, after the petitioner had already been charged with violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 for issuing the same bouncing checks, constitutes double jeopardy.
RULING
The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that no double jeopardy exists. The legal logic is that the crimes of estafa under Article 315(2-d) of the Revised Penal Code and violation of BP 22 are two distinct offenses with different elements. For estafa, the essential elements are: (1) postdating or issuance of a check in payment of an obligation contracted at the time of issuance; (2) lack or insufficiency of funds; and (3) damage to the payee through deceit. In contrast, BP 22 requires only: (1) the making, drawing, and issuance of a check; (2) knowledge of insufficient funds at the time of issue; and (3) subsequent dishonor of the check. Deceit and damage are not required under BP 22, which establishes a presumption of knowledge of insufficiency of funds upon dishonor. Furthermore, the penalties and the nature of the offenses differ; estafa is a crime against property, while BP 22 is a crime against public interest aimed at protecting the banking system. Critically, Section 5 of BP 22 explicitly states that prosecution under it is without prejudice to any liability under the Revised Penal Code. The Court emphasized that a single act can give rise to multiple offenses if their elements are not identical. Since the elements of estafa and BP 22 violation are not the same, prosecuting the petitioner for both does not constitute double jeopardy, which prohibits a second prosecution for the same offense, not for the same act. The remedy of certiorari was also deemed improper, as the denial of a motion to quash should be challenged through a trial on the merits and, if necessary, an appeal.
