G.R. Nos. L-59568-76; January 11, 1990
PETER NIERRAS, petitioner, vs. HON. AUXENCIO C. DACUYCUY and HON. ANTONIO S. LOPEZ, in their capacity as Presiding Judge, Branch IV, Court of First Instance of Leyte, Palo, Leyte, and City Fiscal of Tacloban City, Leyte, respectively, respondents.

FACTS

Petitioner Peter Nierras purchased oil products from Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation. Simultaneous with the delivery, he issued nine checks in payment. Upon presentment, the checks were dishonored by the Philippine National Bank because his account was closed. Despite demands, Nierras failed to make good on the checks. Consequently, two sets of criminal informations were filed against him. The first set charged him with nine counts of violating Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 (the Bouncing Checks Law). The second set charged him with nine counts of estafa under Article 315(2)(d) of the Revised Penal Code, based on the same checks.
Nierras pleaded not guilty to the estafa charges but immediately moved to withdraw his plea to file a motion to quash. He argued that prosecuting him for estafa after he had already been arraigned for violations of B.P. 22 concerning the same checks would place him in double jeopardy. The respondent judge denied his motion to quash, prompting Nierras to file this petition for certiorari.

ISSUE

Whether the prosecution of petitioner for estafa under the Revised Penal Code, after he had already been charged with violations of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 for issuing the same bouncing checks, constitutes double jeopardy.

RULING

The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, ruling that no double jeopardy exists. The legal logic is grounded on the difference in the elements of the two offenses. For estafa under Article 315(2)(d) of the Revised Penal Code, the essential elements are: (1) the postdating or issuance of a check in payment of an obligation contracted at the time of issuance; (2) lack or insufficiency of funds; and (3) damage to the payee through deceit. In contrast, a violation of B.P. 22 under Section 1 requires: (1) the making, drawing, and issuance of a check to apply on account or for value; (2) knowledge of the drawer at the time of issue that he does not have sufficient funds or credit; and (3) subsequent dishonor of the check for insufficiency of funds. Deceit and actual damage are not elements of B.P. 22; the law creates a presumption of knowledge of insufficiency of funds upon dishonor.
The Court emphasized that a single act may give rise to a multiplicity of offenses if the laws violated have distinct elements. Prosecution is prohibited for the same offense, not for the same act. Since the elements of estafa and violation of B.P. 22 are not identical, the two charges constitute separate offenses. This is explicitly supported by Section 5 of B.P. 22, which states that prosecution under the Act is without prejudice to any liability under the Revised Penal Code. Therefore, the filing of both sets of informations is legally permissible. The Court also noted that certiorari was an improper remedy; the correct course was for petitioner to proceed to trial and raise his defenses, with the right to appeal an adverse judgment.