G.R. Nos. 57190-91 and G.R. No. 58532, May 18, 1990 and May 10, 1990
JOSE S. SANTOS, petitioner, vs. COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF CEBU, BRANCH VI, CEBU CITY, HON. RAFAEL T. MENDOZA, Presiding, and CONSOLADOR LAO, respondents.

FACTS

Petitioner Jose S. Santos, a lawyer and a legal officer in the Bureau of Customs, was the complaining witness in two criminal cases against private respondent Consolador Lao. The accused filed a motion to have Santos declared in contempt for allegedly securing a postponement under false pretenses, giving false testimony, and executing an affidavit imputing derogatory conduct to the court. The respondent judge directed Santos to submit an explanation and set hearings. Santos repeatedly sought postponements, failed to appear on several scheduled hearings despite court orders, and submitted explanations that the court found unsatisfactory and containing a falsified certification regarding his whereabouts.
The respondent judge, in an order dated April 10, 1981, found Santos guilty of both indirect and direct contempt. The court imposed fines and imprisonment. Subsequently, in an order dated August 17, 1981, the respondent judge suspended Santos from the practice of law. Santos filed consolidated petitions for certiorari seeking to annul the contempt orders and the suspension order.

ISSUE

The primary issue is whether the respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion in finding Santos guilty of direct contempt and in suspending him from the practice of law.

RULING

The Supreme Court granted the petition regarding the finding of direct contempt but denied it regarding the suspension. The legal logic is bifurcated. First, on direct contempt, the Court ruled that the acts cited—using a falsified certification and making false claims about knowledge of a hearing—were not committed in the presence of or so near the judge as to obstruct court proceedings. Direct contempt under Rule 71 requires misbehavior committed in or so near the presence of the court as to disrupt its business. Since the alleged falsification was presented in a written explanation submitted to the court, it constituted indirect contempt, which requires a charge in writing and an opportunity to be heard. The respondent judge therefore erred in classifying it as direct contempt and imposing summary punishment.
Second, on the suspension from the practice of law, the Court found no grave abuse of discretion. A court has inherent power to suspend or disbar an attorney for misconduct. Santos’s pattern of disrespect, including repeated failures to appear, seeking postponements on untenable grounds, and submitting a falsified document, constituted gross misconduct. This misconduct, demonstrating a lack of candor and truthfulness to the court, showed him to be unfit for the office of an attorney, whether the acts were connected to his professional duties or not. The Court affirmed the suspension but deemed the period already served from August 1981 to February 1982 as sufficient punishment, lifting the suspension with a warning.