GR 57127; (August, 1992) (Digest)
G.R. No. 57127 August 5, 1992
RHODORA DEL CASTILLO, petitioner, vs. HON. CANDIDO AGUINALDO, and SPOUSES ALBERTO OUANO and CHRISTINA RETUYA-OUANO, respondents.
FACTS
The private respondents, spouses Alberto Ouano and Christina Retuya-Ouano, are the owners of a commercial building. They allowed close friends, Tan Ching Hai and spouses Domingo and Ester Tan, to use the entire building primarily for residential purposes, with a token payment of P240.00, under the agreement that the Tans would surrender the premises upon the respondents’ need. The Tans occupied the building from 1970. In 1977, the respondents demanded that the Tans vacate the premises, as the Tans had violated their undertakings by allowing strangers, including petitioner Rhodora del Castillo, to stay and by converting portions into a factory. The petitioner agreed to voluntarily vacate by January 31, 1981, but failed to do so even after a grace period expired on February 28, 1981. Consequently, the respondents filed a civil case for damages and recovery of possession with an application for a preliminary mandatory injunction. The trial court granted the ex-parte writ of preliminary mandatory injunction, ordering the petitioner to immediately vacate. Instead of filing an answer, the petitioner filed a “Motion to Dismiss” on grounds of lack of jurisdiction and an unverified complaint, but this motion lacked a notice of hearing addressed to the parties. The trial court declared the petitioner in default, denied the motion to dismiss, and later rendered a decision against her.
ISSUE
1. Whether the trial court has jurisdiction over the subject matter, i.e., whether the case is an ejectment case (within municipal court jurisdiction) or an accion publiciana for recovery of possession (within Court of First Instance jurisdiction).
2. Whether the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction.
RULING
1. The trial court has jurisdiction. The nature of the action is determined by the averments in the complaint. The complaint alleged that demand to vacate was made in 1977, and the complaint was filed in 1981, which is more than one year from the termination of possession. Therefore, the proper action is an accion publiciana or recovery of possession, not an ejectment case (unlawful detainer), which must be filed within one year. The case thus falls within the jurisdiction of the then Court of First Instance.
2. The trial court did not commit grave abuse of discretion. The petitioner’s “Motion to Dismiss” was fatally defective for lack of a proper notice of hearing addressed to the parties, as required by Rules 15, Sections 4, 5, and 6 of the Rules of Court. The notice was addressed only to the Clerk of Court, requesting submission for resolution without hearing. Consequently, the motion did not toll the reglementary period to file an answer, making the order of default and judgment of default proper. The issuance of the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction was likewise proper under the circumstances.
The petition was dismissed for lack of merit.