G.R. No. 55300 March 15, 1990
FRANKLIN G. GACAL and CORAZON M. GACAL, petitioners, vs. PHILIPPINE AIR LINES, INC., and THE HONORABLE PEDRO SAMSON C. ANIMAS, respondents.

FACTS

Petitioners Franklin and Corazon Gacal were passengers on a Philippine Air Lines (PAL) flight from Davao to Manila on May 21, 1976. Unbeknownst to them and the airline, six members of the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), armed with grenades and pistols, were also on board. These individuals hijacked the aircraft shortly after takeoff. After negotiations and a forced landing in Zamboanga for refueling, a standoff ensued between the hijackers and military forces. A firefight ultimately occurred, resulting in the deaths of several passengers and hijackers. Corazon Gacal suffered injuries while escaping and incurred medical expenses. The petitioners also claimed loss of personal belongings. They filed a damages suit against PAL, alleging gross negligence for its failure to adequately frisk passengers and discover the hijackers’ weapons.
The trial court dismissed the complaint, attributing the damages to force majeure. PAL defended itself by asserting it had exercised the required diligence, noting that during the period of Martial Law, airport security—including passenger frisking and baggage inspection—had been assumed exclusively by military authorities under official directives. PAL argued the hijacking was a fortuitous event beyond its control.

ISSUE

Whether the hijacking incident constitutes a caso fortuito or force majeure that would exempt PAL, as a common carrier, from liability for damages suffered by its passengers.

RULING

The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s dismissal, ruling the hijacking was a force majeure that exempted PAL from liability. The legal logic rests on the established elements of force majeure: the event must be (1) independent of the debtor’s will; (2) unforeseeable or unavoidable; (3) of such character as to render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill the obligation in a normal manner; and (4) the debtor must be free from any contribution to the injury. The Court found all elements present. Crucially, the incident occurred during Martial Law when airport security was under the exclusive jurisdiction and operational control of the military, as evidenced by a Letter of Instruction and official communications. This military take-over rendered it impossible for PAL to perform its own security checks, thereby negating any finding of negligence on its part. The hijacking was an act independent of PAL’s will, perpetrated by armed rebels. While hijacking might be foreseeable under normal circumstances, the specific event and the security context—where PAL was legally barred from conducting inspections—made it unavoidable for the carrier. Consequently, the damages arose from a fortuitous event, and PAL was not liable.