G.R. No. L-52762, August 29, 1980
Herminigildo Base and Paquita Fuentes, petitioners, vs. Hon. Oscar Leviste, in his capacity as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Capiz, Branch II, and Gregorio Duno, respondents.

FACTS

Petitioners Herminigildo Base and Paquita Fuentes were the awarded lessees of Market Stall No. 10 in Pontevedra, Capiz. In 1961, they allowed respondent Gregorio Duno to occupy the stall due to Paquita Fuentes’s health issues. In 1972, petitioners demanded that Duno vacate the premises, but he refused. Consequently, petitioners filed an unlawful detainer case in the Municipal Court, which ruled in their favor on October 1, 1976, ordering Duno to vacate the stall and pay monthly rentals of P17.00 until possession was restored.
Duno appealed to the Court of First Instance (CFI). During the pendency of this appeal, petitioners filed a motion for immediate execution of the municipal court’s judgment on April 24, 1979, citing Duno’s failure to pay the accrued rentals from October 1976. Duno opposed, claiming he had delivered postal money orders totaling P523.00 for the said rentals after the motion was filed. The respondent Judge, Oscar Leviste, denied the motion for execution in an order dated July 3, 1979, stating he was exercising his discretion to deny it, with a suggestion to file a proper motion for consignation. Petitioners’ motion for reconsideration was subsequently denied.

ISSUE

Whether the respondent Judge gravely abused his discretion in denying the motion for immediate execution of the municipal court’s judgment pending appeal, despite the defendant’s failure to pay or deposit the monthly rentals as adjudged.

RULING

Yes, the Supreme Court held that the respondent Judge committed a grave abuse of discretion. The legal logic is anchored on Section 8, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, which governs execution pending appeal in ejectment cases. The rule explicitly provides that if judgment is rendered against the defendant, execution shall issue immediately unless the defendant, to stay execution, perfects an appeal and files a supersedeas bond, and during the pendency of the appeal, deposits with the appellate court the amount of rent due from time to time as fixed by the inferior court.
The Court emphasized that the payment or deposit of current rentals during the appeal is a mandatory condition for staying execution. Failure to comply renders the duty of the appellate court to order execution ministerial and imperative; it is not a matter of judicial discretion. Respondent Duno’s alleged tender of payment via postal money orders after the motion for execution was filed did not constitute compliance with this mandatory requirement. The Court cited jurisprudence stating that mere delay in payment, unless excused by mistake, accident, or fraud—none of which were alleged or proven here—does not justify staying execution. Consequently, the respondent Judge had no discretion to deny the motion for execution. His orders were set aside, and a writ of mandamus was issued directing him to order the execution of the municipal court’s judgment for the restoration of petitioners’ possession.