GR 51759; (October, 1980) (Digest)
G.R. No. L-51759 October 30, 1980
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HON. MARIANO P. FUENTEBELLA, JOSE DAYRIT, JESUS CARMONA, VIRGILIO CLASIO AND REYNATA DAYRIT, respondents.
FACTS
Private respondents were charged with theft. The case suffered numerous postponements, largely at the instance of the defense. On January 25, 1978, the accused, through their original counsels, secured a postponement by misleading the private prosecutor into not attending the hearing. That same afternoon, the accused appeared with a new common counsel, withdrew their motions for postponement, and moved for dismissal due to the prosecution’s absence. The court granted a provisional dismissal. Upon motion for reconsideration by the prosecution, which detailed the deception, Judge Rolando Carandang set aside the dismissal and reinstated the complaint on April 20, 1978. Judge Carandang later inhibited himself, and respondent Judge Mariano Fuentebella was designated. On June 18, 1979, Judge Fuentebella dismissed the reinstated case on the ground of double jeopardy, ruling the original provisional dismissal was equivalent to an acquittal. The prosecution sought certiorari.
ISSUE
Whether the reinstatement of the criminal case by Judge Carandang placed the accused in double jeopardy.
RULING
No, double jeopardy did not attach. The Supreme Court annulled respondent judge’s orders. The legal logic is twofold. First, the right to a speedy trial, which formed the basis for the initial dismissal, was invoked in bad faith. The accused themselves caused the delays and then orchestrated the prosecution’s absence to secure dismissal. They cannot profit from their own wrongdoing; a dismissal under these circumstances, even if labeled as for violation of speedy trial, cannot constitute a valid basis for a claim of acquittal. The provisional dismissal was properly set aside due to the fraud perpetrated upon the court.
Second, the Court clarified the doctrine that a dismissal for denial of the right to speedy trial amounts to an acquittal only when there is a real and actual denial of that right. Here, there was none, as the delay was attributable to the accused. Consequently, Judge Carandang’s order reinstating the case was legal. Furthermore, even assuming arguendo that double jeopardy could be invoked, the respondents waived it by failing to plead it seasonably; they actively participated in the reinstated proceedings for over a year before raising the plea. Therefore, the reinstatement for further proceedings was correct, and the subsequent dismissal by respondent judge was a grave abuse of discretion.