G.R. No. 50654 November 6, 1989
Rudy Gleo Armigos, petitioner, vs. Court of Appeals, Cristito Mata, and Judge L. D. Carpio, in his capacity as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Davao del Sur, Branch V, respondents.

FACTS

Private respondent Cristito Mata filed a complaint for damages and attorney’s fees against petitioner Rudy Gleo Armigos with the Municipal Court of Digos, Davao del Sur. After trial, judgment was rendered in favor of Mata. Armigos received a copy of this decision on June 8, 1977. The following day, June 9, he filed a notice of appeal. He subsequently completed the appeal requirements, including filing an appeal bond and paying the docket fee, on June 24, 1977.
When the case was elevated to the Court of First Instance (CFI), the presiding judge dismissed the appeal, ruling it was filed beyond the 15-day reglementary period. Armigos then filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus with the Court of Appeals, arguing his appeal was timely. He contended that the period should be computed from the exact hour of receipt (4:00 p.m. on June 8), making his completion on June 24 still within the 15-day window.

ISSUE

Whether the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the CFI’s dismissal of the appeal for being filed out of time, specifically regarding the proper method of computing the reglementary appeal period.

RULING

The Supreme Court denied the petition, upholding the Court of Appeals. The legal logic centers on the settled rule for computing periods under Article 13 of the Civil Code and procedural rules, which mandate excluding the first day and including the last day of the period. The Court rejected Armigos’s novel interpretation that computation should start from the exact hour of receipt. It cited the precedent in Republic vs. Encarnacion, which held that a law takes effect from the first minute of the day of its approval, not the exact hour of signing. Applying this by analogy, a period begins from the first minute of the day following receipt of the notice or decision.
The Court found no cogent reason to depart from this established doctrine, noting that adopting an hourly computation would introduce confusion and unreliability, as human memory for exact times is frail unless the event is extraordinary. While such precise computation might apply in specific contexts like the 48-hour appeal in habeas corpus cases, it does not extend to ordinary civil appeals. The perfection of an appeal within the reglementary period is both mandatory and jurisdictional. The Court found no claim or proof from Armigos that his delay was due to fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence, which could have warranted discretionary relief. Thus, the dismissal of his appeal for being filed out of time was proper.