G.R. No. 49145; June 4, 1944
CLEODUALDO C. SIPIN, JOSE CHUA, LIUM SU KHAN, KING WOO, TAN TONG, and TAN LIM, petitioners, vs. COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF MANILA, THE SHERIFF OF MANILA and FERNANDEZ HERMANOS, INC., respondents.

FACTS

Respondent Fernandez Hermanos, Inc., the owner of premises at No. 525 Rizal Avenue, Manila, obtained a judgment of desahucio (ejectment) from the municipal court against its tenant, Jack Maghlen, on January 3, 1944. On January 10, 1944, the court issued a writ of execution commanding the sheriff to cause the defendant and “other occupants” to remove from the premises. The petitioners are subtenants of Jack Maghlen on a day-to-day basis, paying a daily rental. They were not parties to the desahucio case. The petitioners filed a civil case in the Court of First Instance of Manila against the judge, the sheriff, and Fernandez Hermanos, Inc., praying for a preliminary injunction to stop the enforcement of the writ of execution against them. The Court of First Instance denied the petition for preliminary injunction and a subsequent motion for reconsideration. Prior to this, Jack Maghlen had instituted desahucio cases against the petitioners (his subtenants) since October 19, 1943, and obtained judgments; the petitioners appealed those judgments to the Court of First Instance, where the appeals were still pending. The petitioners’ only defense in those cases was that they were not given the five days’ notice required by the Rules of Court nor the three months’ notice required by Executive Order No. 212.

ISSUE

Whether the respondent Court of First Instance abused its discretion or exceeded its jurisdiction in denying the petitioners’ application for a writ of preliminary injunction. This hinges on whether the municipal court acted within its jurisdiction in extending its writ of execution to the petitioners as subtenants.

RULING

The Supreme Court ruled that the Court of First Instance did not abuse its discretion or exceed its jurisdiction. The municipal court acted within its jurisdiction in issuing the writ of execution against the petitioners. The petitioners, as subtenants, are not entitled to the protections of Executive Order No. 212 because their contract with sublessor Jack Maghlen was transient or temporary, as evidenced by clauses stating they must remove their belongings daily at close of business and that the contract was good from day to day, allowing Maghlen to make them vacate at any time. Section 10 of Executive Order No. 212 expressly excludes contracts contemplating transient or temporary occupation. Under Articles 1551 and 1552 of the Civil Code, a sublessee’s rights are subordinate to those of the original lessor; the sublessee is liable to the lessor and cannot invoke a right superior to the sublessor. Once the sublessor (Maghlen) is duly ousted, the sublessee has no right to remain. On equity, the petitioners’ claim of lack of notice from Maghlen cannot be invoked against the owner, Fernandez Hermanos, Inc., and more than seven months had elapsed since Maghlen’s cases against them, giving them ample time to relocate. The petition was dismissed and the preliminary injunction issued by the Supreme Court was dissolved.