G.R. No. 49140; June 26, 1944
RONALD PECK, petitioner, vs. THE HON. ROBERTO CONCEPCION and INES E. VDA. DE MONTENEGRO, respondents.

FACTS

This is a certiorari proceeding to annul an order of the respondent Judge dated March 6, 1944, in Civil Case No. 1550. The case originated from an unlawful detainer suit where the Municipal Court of Manila rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiff, Ines E. Vda. de Montenegro, ordering the defendant, Ronald Peck, to vacate the premises and pay a monthly rental of P55 from October 1943 until restitution. The judgment, however, granted the defendant a three-month grace period to vacate, pursuant to Executive Order No. 212. During the pendency of Peck’s appeal to the Court of First Instance, he failed to pay or deposit the P55 rental for January 1944 within the first ten days of that month, doing so only on January 19. Montenegro moved for immediate execution of the appealed judgment under Section 8 of Rule 72. The respondent Judge granted the motion. Peck filed a motion for reconsideration and a petition for an extension, arguing he had until February 10 to deposit the January rental and requesting that execution be stayed until March 31, 1944. The respondent Judge denied the motion, holding the issuance of execution was mandatory and he had no authority to grant an extension.

ISSUE

Whether the respondent Judge acted correctly in ordering the immediate execution of the judgment due to the defendant’s failure to pay or deposit the monthly rental on time during the pendency of the appeal, specifically regarding the interpretation of the payment deadline under Section 8, Rule 72.

RULING

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the respondent Judge and dismissed the petition. The Court held that the conditions for staying execution under Section 8 of Rule 72 are mandatory. The judgment of the Municipal Court, which ordered payment of a monthly rental of P55, was based on an existing written contract of lease between the parties for a month-to-month tenancy at that rate, payable in advance. This contract was alleged in the complaint and attached to the record, and was not denied by the petitioner. Therefore, the payment obligation was governed by the contract, requiring payment “from time to time under the contract,” and not by the alternative provision for payment “on or before the 10th day of each calendar month” which applies only in the absence of a contract. The petitioner’s own conduct, having deposited rentals in advance for other months, confirmed his understanding of this contractual obligation. His failure to pay or deposit the rental for January 1944 within the stipulated period (the first ten days of January) constituted a breach of the mandatory condition for staying execution. Consequently, the respondent Judge had no discretion and was duty-bound to issue the writ of execution. The preliminary injunction issued by the Supreme Court was dissolved, with costs against the petitioner.