G.R. No. 49062; March 24, 1944
BASILIO GARCIA, petitioner, vs. AMADO BUENAVENTURA, respondent.

FACTS

In Civil Case No. 7848 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, the trial court rendered its decision on November 21, 1941, which was notified to the plaintiff’s attorney on November 22, 1941. On December 19, 1941 (27 days after notification), the plaintiff’s counsel mailed a motion for reconsideration. This motion was denied on July 15, 1942, and notice of denial was received by counsel on July 30, 1942. On that same date, counsel filed a notice of appeal and a motion for a 15-day extension to perfect the appeal, which the court granted. The original 30-day reglementary period had 3 days remaining, so the plaintiff had a total of 18 days (3 + 15) from July 30, 1942, expiring on August 17, 1942. Two days before expiration, counsel filed an ex-parte petition for a second extension of 10 days, which the court granted on August 18, 1942. Notice of this granting order was received by counsel on August 24, 1942. The plaintiff filed the record on appeal and appeal bond on September 4, 1942.
The trial court initially disallowed the appeal as filed out of time but, upon a motion for reconsideration alleging accident and excusable neglect, allowed it. The trial court computed the period by counting the 10-day extension plus the 3 remaining days (totaling 13 days) from August 24, 1942 (when counsel received notice of the second extension), concluding that September 4, 1942, was within time. The Court of Appeals, however, computed the 10-day extension from August 24, 1942, and held that the period expired on September 3, 1942, dismissing the appeal as late. The petitioner attempted to justify the one-day delay by alleging a nervous breakdown on September 3, 1942, due to his son’s death in Bataan, but the Court of Appeals deemed this insufficient given the prior extensions.

ISSUE

Whether the Court of Appeals correctly dismissed the appeal for having been filed out of time, specifically regarding the computation of the extension periods for perfecting the appeal.

RULING

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the Court of Appeals dismissing the appeal. The Court held that both the parties and the lower courts erred in counting the second 10-day extension from August 24, 1942 (the date counsel received notice of the granting order). The correct computation is that the extension periods must be joined to the original or preceding period without interruption. Since the first extension (15 days plus the 3 remaining days) expired on August 17, 1942, the second 10-day extension commenced immediately on August 18, 1942, and expired on August 27, 1942. Therefore, the filing on September 4, 1942, was 8 days late. The Court emphasized that a pending motion for extension does not suspend the running of the period; if granted, the extension runs from the expiration of the original or preceding period. The alleged nervous breakdown on September 3, 1942, was irrelevant as it occurred after the period had already lapsed. The Court further clarified that a trial court has no discretion to allow an appeal filed out of time unless there is legal justification such as fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence under Rule 38, Section 2, which was absent here. Thus, the judgment had become final and executory.